THEAETETUS

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE: Socrates, Theodorus, Theaetetus.

1.       EUCLEIDES: Just in from the country, Terpsion, or did you come some time ago?
2.       TERPSION: Quite a while ago; and I was looking for you in the market-place and
3.       wondering that I could not find you.
4.       EUCLEIDES: Well, you see, I was not in the city.
5.       TERPSION: Where then?
6.       EUCLEIDES: As I was going down to the harbor I met Theaetetus being carried to
7.       Athens from the camp at Corinth.
8.       TERPSION: Alive or dead?
9.       EUCLEIDES: Just barely alive; for he is suffering severely from wounds, and, worse
10.     than that, he has been taken with the sickness that has broken out in the army.
11.     TERPSION: You mean the dysentery?
12.     EUCLEIDES: Yes.
13.     TERPSION: What a man he is who you say is in danger!
14.     EUCLEIDES: A noble man, Terpsion, and indeed just now I heard some people praising
15.     him highly for his conduct in the battle.
16.     TERPSION: That is not at all strange; it would have been much more remarkable if he
17.     had not so conducted himself. But why did he not top here in Megara?
18.     EUCLEIDES: He was in a hurry to get home; for I begged and advised him to stop, but
19.     he would not. So I went along with him, and as I was coming back I thought of
20.     Socrates and wondered at his prophetic gift, especially in what he said about him.
21.     For I think he met him a little before his own death, when Theaetetus was a mere
22.     boy, and as a result of acquaintance and conversation with him, he greatly admired
23.     his qualities. When I went to Athens he related to me the conversation he had with
24.     him, which was well worth hearing, and he said he would surely become a notable man
25.     if he lived.
26.     TERPSION: And he was right, apparently. But what was the talk? Could you relate it?
27.     EUCLEIDES: No, by Zeus, at least not offhand. But I made notes at the time as soon
28.     as I reached home, then afterwards at my leisure, as I recalled things, I wrote them
29.     down, and whenever I went to Athens I used to ask Socrates about what I could not
30.     remember, and then I came here and made corrections; so that I have pretty much the
31.     whole talk written down.
32.     TERPSION: That is true. I heard you say so before; and really I have been waiting
33.     about here all along intending to ask you to show it to me. What hinders us from
34.     reading it now? Certainly I need to rest, since I have come from the country.
35.     EUCLEIDES: And I myself went with Theaetetus as far as Erineum, so I also should not
36.     be sorry to take a rest. Come, let us go, and while we are resting, the boy shall
37.     read to us.
38.     TERPSION: Very well.
39.     EUCLEIDES: Here is the book, Terpsion. Now this is the way I wrote the conversation:
40.     I did not represent Socrates relating it to me, as he did, but conversing with those
41.     with whom he told me he conversed. And he told me they were the geometrician
42.     Theodorus and Theaetetus. Now in order that the explanatory words between the
43.     speeches might not be annoying in the written account, such as “and I said” or “and
44.     I remarked,” whenever Socrates spoke, or “he agreed or he did not agree,” in the
45.     case of the interlocutor, I omitted all that sort of thing and represented Socrates
46.     himself as talking with them.
47.     TERPSION: That is quite fitting, Eucleides.
48.     EUCLEIDES: Come, boy, take the book and read.
49.     SOCRATES: If I cared more for Cyrene and its affairs, Theodorus, I should ask you
50.     about things there and about the people, whether any of the young men there are
51.     devoting themselves to geometry or any other form of philosophy; but as it is, since
52.     I care less for those people than for the people here, I am more eager to know which
53.     of our own young men are likely to gain reputation. These are the things I myself
54.     investigate, so far as I can, and about which I question those others with whom I
55.     see that the young men like to associate. Now a great many of them come to you, and
56.     rightly, for you deserve it on account of your geometry, not to speak of other
57.     reasons. So if you have met with any young man who is worth mentioning, I should
58.     like to hear about him.
59.     THEODORUS: Truly, Socrates, it is well worth while for me to talk and for you to
60.     hear about a splendid young fellow, one of your fellow-citizens, whom I have met.
61.     Now if he were handsome, I should be very much afraid to speak, lest someone should
62.     think I was in love with him. But the fact is—now don't be angry with me—he is not
63.     handsome, but is like you in his snub nose and protruding eyes, only those features
64.     are less marked in him than in you..
65.     EUCLEIDES: Just in from the country, Terpsion, or did you come some time ago?
66.     TERPSION: Quite a while ago; and I was looking for you in the market-place and
67.     wondering that I could not find you.
68.     EUCLEIDES: Well, you see, I was not in the city.
69.     TERPSION: Where then?
70.     EUCLEIDES: As I was going down to the harbor I met Theaetetus being carried to
71.     Athens from the camp at Corinth.
72.     TERPSION: Alive or dead?
73.     EUCLEIDES: Just barely alive; for he is suffering severely from wounds, and, worse
74.     than that, he has been taken with the sickness that has broken out in the army.
75.     TERPSION: You mean the dysentery?
76.     EUCLEIDES: Yes.
77.     TERPSION: What a man he is who you say is in danger!
78.     EUCLEIDES: A noble man, Terpsion, and indeed just now I heard some people praising
79.     him highly for his conduct in the battle.
80.     TERPSION: That is not at all strange; it would have been much more remarkable if he
81.     had not so conducted himself. But why did he not top here in Megara?
82.     EUCLEIDES: He was in a hurry to get home; for I begged and advised him to stop, but
83.     he would not. So I went along with him, and as I was coming back I thought of
84.     Socrates and wondered at his prophetic gift, especially in what he said about him.
85.     For I think he met him a little before his own death, when Theaetetus was a mere
86.     boy, and as a result of acquaintance and conversation with him, he greatly admired
87.     his qualities. When I went to Athens he related to me the conversation he had with
88.     him, which was well worth hearing, and he said he would surely become a notable man
89.     if he lived.
90.     TERPSION: And he was right, apparently. But what was the talk? Could you relate it?
91.     EUCLEIDES: No, by Zeus, at least not offhand. But I made notes at the time as soon
92.     as I reached home, then afterwards at my leisure, as I recalled things, I wrote them
93.     down, and whenever I went to Athens I used to ask Socrates about what I could not
94.     remember, and then I came here and made corrections; so that I have pretty much the
95.     whole talk written down.
96.     TERPSION: That is true. I heard you say so before; and really I have been waiting
97.     about here all along intending to ask you to show it to me. What hinders us from
98.     reading it now? Certainly I need to rest, since I have come from the country.
99.     EUCLEIDES: And I myself went with Theaetetus as far as Erineum, so I also should not
100.   be sorry to take a rest. Come, let us go, and while we are resting, the boy shall
101.   read to us.
102.   TERPSION: Very well.
103.   EUCLEIDES: Here is the book, Terpsion. Now this is the way I wrote the conversation:
104.   I did not represent Socrates relating it to me, as he did, but conversing with those
105.   with whom he told me he conversed. And he told me they were the geometrician
106.   Theodorus and Theaetetus. Now in order that the explanatory words between the
107.   speeches might not be annoying in the written account, such as “and I said” or “and
108.   I remarked,” whenever Socrates spoke, or “he agreed or he did not agree,” in the
109.   case of the interlocutor, I omitted all that sort of thing and represented Socrates
110.   himself as talking with them.
111.   TERPSION: That is quite fitting, Eucleides.
112.   EUCLEIDES: Come, boy, take the book and read.
113.   SOCRATES: If I cared more for Cyrene and its affairs, Theodorus, I should ask you
114.   about things there and about the people, whether any of the young men there are
115.   devoting themselves to geometry or any other form of philosophy; but as it is, since
116.   I care less for those people than for the people here, I am more eager to know which
117.   of our own young men are likely to gain reputation. These are the things I myself
118.   investigate, so far as I can, and about which I question those others with whom I
119.   see that the young men like to associate. Now a great many of them come to you, and
120.   rightly, for you deserve it on account of your geometry, not to speak of other
121.   reasons. So if you have met with any young man who is worth mentioning, I should
122.   like to hear about him.
123.   THEODORUS: Truly, Socrates, it is well worth while for me to talk and for you to
124.   hear about a splendid young fellow, one of your fellow-citizens, whom I have met.
125.   Now if he were handsome, I should be very much afraid to speak, lest someone should
126.   think I was in love with him. But the fact is—now don't be angry with me—he is not
127.   handsome, but is like you in his snub nose and protruding eyes, only those features
128.   are less marked in him than in you. You see I speak fearlessly. But I assure you
129.   that among all the young men I have ever met—and I have had to do with a great many
130.   —I never yet found one of such marvelously fine qualities. He is quick to learn,
131.   beyond almost anyone else, yet exceptionally gentle, and moreover brave beyond any
132.   other; I should not have supposed such a combination existed, and I do not see it
133.   elsewhere. On the contrary, those who, like him, have quick, sharp minds and good
134.   memories, have usually also quick tempers; they dart off and are swept away, like
135.   ships without ballast; they are excitable rather than courageous; those, on the
136.   other hand, who are steadier are somewhat dull when brought face to face with
137.   learning, and are very forgetful. But this boy advances toward learning and
138.   investigation smoothly and surely and successfully, with perfect gentleness, like a
139.   stream of oil that flows without a sound, so that one marvels how he accomplishes
140.   all this at his age.
141.   SOCRATES: That is good news; but which of our citizens is his father?
142.   THEODORUS: I have heard the name, but do not remember it. However, it does not
143.   matter, for the youth is the middle one of those who are now coming toward us. He
144.   and those friends of his were anointing themselves in the outer course, and now they
145.   seem to have finished and to be coming here. See if you recognize him.
146.   SOCRATES: Yes, I do. He is the son of Euphronius of Sunium, who is a man of just the
147.   sort you describe, and of good repute in other respects; moreover he left a very
148.   large property. But the youth's name I do not know.
149.   THEODORUS: Theaetetus is his name, Socrates; but I believe the property was
150.   squandered by trustees. Nevertheless, Socrates, he is remarkably liberal with his
151.   money, too.
152.   SOCRATES: It is a noble man that you describe. Now please tell him to come here and
153.   sit by us.
154.   THEODORUS: I will. Theaetetus, come here to Socrates.
155.   SOCRATES: Yes, do so, Theaetetus, that I may look at myself and see what sort of a
156.   face I have; for Theodorus says it is like yours. Now if we each had a lyre, and he
157.   said we had tuned them to the same key, should we take his word for it without more
158.   ado, or should we inquire first whether he who said it was a musician?
159.   THEAETETUS: We should inquire.
160.   SOCRATES: Then if we found that he was a musician, we should believe him, but if
161.   not, we should refuse to take his word?
162.   THEAETETUS: Yes.
163.   SOCRATES: But now, if we are concerned about the likeness of our faces, we must
164.   consider whether he who speaks is a painter, or not.
165.   THEAETETUS: I think we must.
166.   SOCRATES: Well, is Theodorus a painter?
167.   THEAETETUS: Not so far as I know.
168.   SOCRATES: Nor a geometrician, either?
169.   THEAETETUS: Oh yes, decidedly, Socrates.
170.   SOCRATES: And an astronomer, and an arithmetician, and a musician, and in general an
171.   educated man?
172.   THEAETETUS: I think so.
173.   SOCRATES: Well then, if he says, either in praise or blame, that we have some
174.   physical resemblance, it is not especially worth while to pay attention to him.
175.   THEAETETUS: Perhaps not.
176.   SOCRATES: But what if he should praise the soul of one of us for virtue and wisdom?
177.   Is it not worth while for the one who hears to examine eagerly the one who is
178.   praised, and for that one to exhibit his qualities with eagerness?
179.   THEAETETUS: Certainly, Socrates.
180.   SOCRATES: Then, my dear Theaetetus, this is just the time for you to exhibit your
181.   qualities and for me to examine them; for I assure you that Theodorus, though he has
182.   praised many foreigners and citizens to me, never praised anyone as he praised you
183.   just now.
184.   THEAETETUS: A good idea, Socrates; but make sure that he was not speaking in jest.
185.   SOCRATES: That is not Theodorus's way. But do not seek to draw back from your
186.   agreement on the pretext that he is jesting, or he will be forced to testify under
187.   oath; for certainly no one will accuse him of perjury. Come, be courageous and hold
188.   to the agreement.
189.   THEAETETUS: I suppose I must, if you say so.
190.   SOCRATES: Now tell me; I suppose you learn some geometry from Theodorus?
191.   THEAETETUS: Yes.
192.   SOCRATES: And astronomy and harmony and arithmetic?
193.   THEAETETUS: I try hard to do so.
194.   SOCRATES: And so do I, my boy, from him and from any others who I think know
195.   anything about these things. But nevertheless, although in other respects I get on
196.   fairly well in them, yet I am in doubt about one little matter, which should be
197.   investigated with your help and that of these others. Tell me, is not learning
198.   growing wiser about that which one learns?
199.   THEAETETUS: Of course.
200.   SOCRATES: And the wise, I suppose, are wise by wisdom.
201.   THEAETETUS: Yes.
202.   SOCRATES: And does this differ at all from knowledge?
203.   THEAETETUS: Does what differ?
204.   SOCRATES: Wisdom. Or are not people wise in that of which they have knowledge?
205.   THEAETETUS: Of course.
206.   SOCRATES: Then knowledge and wisdom are the same thing?
207.   THEAETETUS: Yes.
208.   SOCRATES: Well, it is just this that I am in doubt about and cannot fully grasp by
209.   my own efforts—what knowledge really is.. Can we tell that? What do you say? Who of
210.   us will speak first? And he who fails, and whoever fails in turn, shall go and sit
211.   down and be donkey, as the children say when they play ball; and whoever gets
212.   through without failing shall be our king and shall order us to answer any questions
213.   he pleases. Why are you silent? I hope, Theodorus, I am not rude, through my love of
214.   discussion and my eagerness to make us converse and show ourselves friends and ready
215.   to talk to one another.
216.   THEODORUS: That sort of thing would not be at all rude, Socrates; but tell one of
217.   the youths to answer your questions; for I am unused to such conversation and,
218.   moreover, I am not of an age to accustom myself to it. But that would be fitting for
219.   these young men, and they would improve much more than I; for the fact is, youth
220.   admits of improvement in every way. Come, question Theaetetus as you began to do,
221.   and do not let him off.
222.   SOCRATES: Well, Theaetetus, you hear what Theodorus says, and I think you will not
223.   wish to disobey him, nor is it right for a young person to disobey a wise man when
224.   he gives instructions about such matters. Come, speak up well and nobly. What do you
225.   think knowledge is?
226.   THEAETETUS: Well, Socrates, I must, since you bid me. For, if I make a mistake, you
227.   are sure to set me right.
228.   SOCRATES: Certainly, if we can.
229.   THEAETETUS: Well then, I think the things one might learn from Theodorus are
230.   knowledge—geometry and all the things you spoke of just now—and also cobblery and
231.   the other craftsmen's arts; each and all of these are nothing else but knowledge.
232.   SOCRATES: You are noble and generous, my friend, for when you are asked for one
233.   thing you give many, and a variety of things instead of a simple answer.
234.   THEAETETUS: What do you mean by that, Socrates?
235.   SOCRATES: Nothing, perhaps; but I will tell you what I think I mean. When you say
236.   “cobblery” you speak of nothing else than the art of making shoes, do you?
237.   THEAETETUS: Nothing else.
238.   SOCRATES: And when you say “carpentry”? Do you mean anything else than the art of
239.   making wooden furnishings?
240.   THEAETETUS: Nothing else by that, either.
241.   SOCRATES: Then in both cases you define that to which each form of knowledge
242.   belongs?
243.   THEAETETUS: Yes.
244.   SOCRATES: But the question, Theaetetus, was not to what knowledge belongs, nor how
245.   many the forms of knowledge are; for we did not wish to number them, but to find out
246.   what knowledge itself really is. Or is there nothing in what I say?
247.   THEAETETUS: Nay, you are quite right..
248.   SOCRATES: Take this example. If anyone should ask us about some common everyday
249.   thing, for instance, what clay is, and we should reply that it is the potters' clay
250.   and the oven makers' clay and the brickmakers' clay, should we not be ridiculous?
251.   THEAETETUS: Perhaps.
252.   SOCRATES: Yes in the first place for assuming that the questioner can understand
253.   from our answer what clay is, when we say “clay,” no matter whether we add “the
254.   image-makers'” or any other craftsmen's. Or does anyone, do you think, understand
255.   the name of anything when he does not know what the thing is?
256.   THEAETETUS: By no means.
257.   SOCRATES: Then he does not understand knowledge of shoes if he does not know
258.   knowledge.
259.   THEAETETUS: No.
260.   SOCRATES: Then he who is ignorant of knowledge does not understand cobblery or any
261.   other art.
262.   THEAETETUS: That is true.
263.   SOCRATES: Then it is a ridiculous answer to the question “what is knowledge?” when
264.   we give the name of some art; for we give in our answer something that knowledge
265.   belongs to, when that was not what we were asked.
266.   THEAETETUS: So it seems.
267.   SOCRATES: Secondly, when we might have given a short, everyday answer, we go an
268.   interminable distance round; for instance, in the question about clay, the everyday,
269.   simple thing would be to say “clay is earth mixed with moisture” without regard to
270.   whose clay it is.
271.   THEAETETUS: It seems easy just now, Socrates, as you put it; but you are probably
272.   asking the kind of thing that came up among us lately when your namesake, Socrates
273.   here, and I were talking together.
274.   SOCRATES: What kind of thing was that, Theaetetus?
275.   THEAETETUS: Theodorus here was drawing some figures for us in illustration of roots,
276.   showing that squares containing three square feet and five square feet are not
277.   commensurable in length with the unit of the foot, and so, selecting each one in its
278.   turn up to the square containing seventeen square feet and at that he stopped. Now
279.   it occurred to us, since the number of roots appeared to be infinite, to try to
280.   collect them under one name, by which we could henceforth call all the roots.
281.   SOCRATES: And did you find such a name?
282.   THEAETETUS: I think we did. But see if you agree.
283.   SOCRATES: Speak on.
284.   THEAETETUS: We divided all number into two classes. The one, the numbers which can
285.   be formed by multiplying equal factors, we represented by the shape of the square
286.   and called square or equilateral numbers.
287.   SOCRATES: Well done!
288.   THEAETETUS: The numbers between these, such as three. and five and all numbers which
289.   cannot be formed by multiplying equal factors, but only by multiplying a greater by
290.   a less or a less by a greater, and are therefore always contained in unequal sides,
291.   we represented by the shape of the oblong rectangle and called oblong numbers.
292.   SOCRATES: Very good; and what next?
293.   THEAETETUS: All the lines which form the four sides of the equilateral or square
294.   numbers we called lengths, and those which form the oblong numbers we called surds,
295.   because they are not commensurable with the others in length, but only in the areas
296.   of the planes which they have the power to form. And similarly in the case of
297.   solids.
298.   SOCRATES: Most excellent, my boys! I think Theodorus will not be found liable to an
299.   action for false witness.
300.   THEAETETUS: But really, Socrates, I cannot answer that question of yours about
301.   knowledge, as we answered the question about length and square roots. And yet you
302.   seem to me to want something of that kind. So Theodorus appears to be a false
303.   witness after all.
304.   SOCRATES: Nonsense! If he were praising your running and said he had never met any
305.   young man who was so good a runner, and then you were beaten in a race by a full
306.   grown man who held the record, do you think his praise would be any less truthful?
307.   THEAETETUS: Why, no.
308.   SOCRATES: And do you think that the discovery of knowledge, as I was just now
309.   saying, is a small matter and not a task for the very ablest men?
310.   THEAETETUS: By Zeus, I think it is a task for the very ablest.
311.   SOCRATES: Then you must have confidence in yourself, and believe that Theodorus is
312.   right, and try earnestly in every way to gain an understanding of the nature of
313.   knowledge as well as of other things.
314.   THEAETETUS: If it is a question of earnestness, Socrates, the truth will come to
315.   light.
316.   SOCRATES: Well then—for you pointed out the way admirably just now—take your
317.   answer about the roots as a model, and just as you embraced them all in one class,
318.   though they were many, try to designate the many forms of knowledge by one definition.
319.   THEAETETUS: But I assure you, Socrates, I have often tried to work that out, when I
320.   heard reports of the questions that you asked, but I can neither persuade myself
321.   that I have any satisfactory answer, nor can I find anyone else who gives the kind
322.   of answer you insist upon; and yet, on the other hand, I cannot get rid of a feeling
323.   of concern about the matter.
324.   SOCRATES: Yes, you are suffering the pangs of labor, Theaetetus, because you
325.   are not empty, but pregnant.
326.   THEAETETUS: I do not know, Socrates; I merely tell you what I feel. That is, cubes
327.   and cube roots..
328.   SOCRATES: Have you then not heard, you absurd boy, that I am the son of a noble
329.   and burly midwife, Phaenarete?
330.   THEAETETUS: Yes, I have heard that.
331.   SOCRATES: And have you also heard that I practise the same art?
332.   THEAETETUS: No, never.
333.   SOCRATES: But I assure you it is true; only do not tell on me to the others; for it
334.   is not known that I possess this art. But other people, since they do not know it,
335.   do not say this of me, but say that I am a most eccentric person and drive men to
336.   distraction. Have you heard that also?
337.   THEAETETUS: Yes, I have.
338.   SOCRATES: Shall I tell you the reason then?
339.   THEAETETUS: Oh yes, do.
340.   SOCRATES: Just take into consideration the whole business of the midwives, and you
341.   will understand more easily what I mean. For you know, I suppose, that no one of
342.   them attends other women while she is still capable of conceiving and bearing but
343.   only those do so who have become too old to bear.
344.   THEAETETUS: Yes, certainly.
345.   SOCRATES: They say the cause of this is Artemis, because she, a childless goddess,
346.   has had childbirth allotted to her as her special province. Now it would seem she
347.   did not allow barren women to be midwives, because human nature is too weak to
348.   acquire an art which deals with matters of which it has no experience, but she gave
349.   the office to those who on account of age were not bearing children, honoring them
350.   for their likeness to herself.
351.   THEAETETUS: Very likely.
352.   SOCRATES: Is it not, then, also likely and even necessary, that midwives should know
353.   better than anyone else who are pregnant and who are not?
354.   THEAETETUS: Certainly.
355.   SOCRATES: And furthermore, the midwives, by means of drugs and incantations, are
356.   able to arouse the pangs of labor and, if they wish, to make them milder, and to
357.   cause those to bear who have difficulty in bearing; and they cause miscarriages if
358.   they think them desirable.
359.   THEAETETUS: That is true.
360.   SOCRATES: Well, have you noticed this also about them, that they are the most
361.   skillful of matchmakers, since they are very wise in knowing what union of man and
362.   woman will produce the best possible children?
363.   THEAETETUS: I do not know that at all.
364.   SOCRATES: But be assured that they are prouder of this than of their skill in
365.   cutting the umbilical cord. Just consider. Do you think the knowledge of what soil
366.   is best for each plant or seed belongs to the same art as the tending and harvesting
367.   of the fruits of the earth, or to another?
368.   THEAETETUS: To the same art.
369.   SOCRATES: And in the case of a woman, do you think, my friend, that there is one art
370.   for the sowing and another for the harvesting?
371.   THEAETETUS: It is not likely..
372.   SOCRATES: No; but because there is a wrongful and unscientific way of bringing men
373.   and women together, which is called pandering, the midwives, since they are women of
374.   dignity and worth, avoid matchmaking, through fear of falling under the charge of
375.   pandering. And yet the true midwife is the only proper match-maker.
376.   THEAETETUS: It seems so.
377.   SOCRATES: So great, then, is the importance of midwives; but their function is less
378.   important than mine. For women do not, like my patients, bring forth at one time
379.   real children and at another mere images which it is difficult to distinguish from
380.   the real. For if they did, the greatest and noblest part of the work of the midwives
381.   would be in distinguishing between the real and the false. Do you not think so?
382.   THEAETETUS: Yes, I do.
383.   SOCRATES: All that is true of their art of midwifery is true also of mine, but mine
384.   differs from theirs in being practised upon men, not women, and in tending their
385.   souls in labor, not their bodies. But the greatest thing about my art is this, that
386.   it can test in every way whether the mind of the young man is bringing forth a mere
387.   image, an imposture, or a real and genuine offspring. For I have this in common with
388.   the midwives: I am sterile in point of wisdom, and the reproach which has often been
389.   brought against me, that I question others but make no reply myself about anything,
390.   because I have no wisdom in me, is a true reproach; and the reason of it is this:
391.   the god compels me to act as midwife, but has never allowed me to bring forth. I am,
392.   then, not at all a wise person myself, nor have I any wise invention, the offspring
393.   born of my own soul; but those who associate with me, although at first some of them
394.   seem very ignorant, yet, as our acquaintance advances, all of them to whom the god
395.   is gracious make wonderful progress, not only in their own opinion, but in that of
396.   others as well. And it is clear that they do this, not because they have ever
397.   learned anything from me, but because they have found in themselves many fair things
398.   and have brought them forth. But the delivery is due to the god and me. And the
399.   proof of it is this: many before now, being ignorant of this fact and thinking that
400.   they were themselves the cause of their success, but despising me, have gone away
401.   from me sooner than they ought, whether of their own accord or because others
402.   persuaded them to do so. Then, after they have gone away, they have miscarried
403.   thenceforth on account of evil companionship, and the offspring which they had
404.   brought forth through my assistance they have reared so badly that they have lost
405.   it; they have considered impostures and images of more importance than the truth,
406.   and at last it was evident to themselves, as well as to others, that they were
407.   ignorant. One of these was. Aristeides, the son of Lysimachus, and there are very
408.   many more. When such men come back and beg me, as they do, with wonderful eagerness
409.   to let them join me again, the spiritual monitor that comes to me forbids me to
410.   associate with some of them, but allows me to converse with others, and these again
411.   make progress. Now those who associate with me are in this matter also like women in
412.   childbirth; they are in pain and are full of trouble night and day, much more than
413.   are the women; and my art can arouse this pain and cause it to cease. Well, that is
414.   what happens to them. But in some cases, Theaetetus, when they do not seem to me to
415.   be exactly pregnant, since I see that they have no need of me, I act with perfect
416.   goodwill as match-maker and, under the gods, I guess very successfully with whom they can
417.   associate profitably, and I have handed over many of them to Prodicus, and many to
418.   other wise and inspired men. Now I have said all this to you at such length, my dear
419.   boy, because I suspect that you, as you yourself believe, are in pain because you
420.   are pregnant with something within you. Apply, then, to me, remembering that I am
421.   the son of a midwife and have myself a midwife's gifts, and do your best to answer
422.   the questions I ask as I ask them. And if, when I have examined any of the things
423.   you say, it should prove that I think it is a mere image and not real, and therefore
424.   quietly take it from you and throw it away, do not be angry as women are when they
425.   are deprived of their first offspring. For many, my dear friend, before this have
426.   got into such a state of mind towards me that they are actually ready to bite me, if
427.   I take some foolish notion away from them, and they do not believe that I do this in
428.   kindness, since they are far from knowing that no god is unkind to mortals, and that
429.   I do nothing of this sort from unkindness, either, and that it is quite out of the
430.   question for me to allow an imposture or to destroy the true. And so, Theaetetus,
431.   begin again and try to tell us what knowledge is. And never say that you are unable
432.   to do so; for if the gods will it and gives you courage, you will be able.
433.   THEAETETUS: Well then, Socrates, since you are so urgent it would be disgraceful for
434.   anyone not to exert himself in every way to say what he can. I think, then, that he
435.   who knows anything perceives that which he knows, and, as it appears at present,
436.   knowledge is nothing else than perception.
437.   SOCRATES: Good! Excellent, my boy! That is the way one ought to speak out. But come
438.   now, let us examine your utterance together, and see whether it is a real offspring
439.   or a mere wind-egg. Perception, you say, is knowledge?
440.   THEAETETUS: Yes.
441.   SOCRATES: And, indeed, if I may venture to say so, it is not a bad description of
442.   knowledge. that you have given, but one which Protagoras also used to give. Only, he
443.   has said the same thing in a different way. For he says somewhere that man is “the
444.   measure of all things, of the existence of the things that are and the non-existence
445.   of the things that are not.” You have read that, I suppose?
446.   THEAETETUS: Yes, I have read it often.
447.   SOCRATES: Well, is not this about what he means, that individual things are for me
448.   such as they appear to me, and for you in turn such as they appear to you —you and I
449.   being “man”?
450.   THEAETETUS: Yes, that is what he says.
451.   SOCRATES: It is likely that a wise man is not talking nonsense; so let us follow
452.   after him. Is it not true that sometimes, when the same wind blows, one of us feels
453.   cold, and the other does not? or one feels slightly and the other exceedingly cold?
454.   THEAETETUS: Certainly.
455.   SOCRATES: Then in that case, shall we say that the wind is in itself cold or not
456.   cold or shall we accept Protagoras's saying that it is cold for him who feels cold
457.   and not for him who does not?
458.   THEAETETUS: Apparently we shall accept that.
459.   SOCRATES: Then it also seems cold, or not, to each of the two?
460.   THEAETETUS: Yes.
461.   SOCRATES: But “seems” denotes perceiving?
462.   THEAETETUS: It does.
463.   SOCRATES: Then seeming and perception are the same thing in matters of warmth and
464.   everything of that sort. For as each person perceives things, such they are to each
465.   person.
466.   THEAETETUS: Apparently.
467.   SOCRATES: Perception, then, is always of that which exists and, since it is
468.   knowledge, cannot be false.
469.   THEAETETUS: So it seems.
470.   SOCRATES: By the Graces! I wonder if Protagoras, who was a very wise man, did not
471.   utter this dark saying to the common herd like ourselves, and tell the truth in
472.   secret to his pupils.
473.   THEAETETUS: Why, Socrates, what do you mean by that?
474.   SOCRATES: I will tell you and it is not a bad description, either, that nothing is
475.   one and invariable, and you could not rightly ascribe any quality whatsoever to
476.   anything, but if you call it large it will also appear to be small, and light if you
477.   call it heavy, and everything else in the same way, since nothing whatever is one,
478.   either a particular thing or of a particular quality; but it is out of movement and
479.   motion and mixture with one another that all those things become which we wrongly
480.   say “are”—wrongly, because nothing ever is, but is always becoming. And on this
481.   subject all the philosophers, except Parmenides, may be marshalled in one line—
482.   Protagoras and Heracleitus and Empedocles—and the chief poets in the two kinds of
483.   poetry, Epicharmus, in comedy, and in tragedy, Homer, who, in the line“ceanus the
484.   origin of the gods, and Tethys their mother,” has said that all things are the
485.   offspring of flow and motion; or don't you think he means that?
486.   THEAETETUS: I think he does.
487.   SOCRATES: Then who could still contend with such a great host, led by Homer as
488.   general, and not make himself ridiculous?
489.   THEAETETUS: It is not easy, Socrates.
490.   SOCRATES: No, Theaetetus, it is not. For the doctrine is amply proved by this,
491.   namely, that motion is the cause of that which passes for existence, that is, of
492.   becoming, whereas rest is the cause of non-existence and destruction; for warmth or
493.   fire, which, you know, is the parent and preserver of all other things, is itself
494.   the offspring of movement and friction, and these two are forms of motion. Or are
495.   not these the source of fire?
496.   THEAETETUS: Yes, they are.
497.   SOCRATES: And furthermore, the animal kingdom is sprung from these same sources.
498.   THEAETETUS: Of course.
499.   SOCRATES: Well, then, is not the bodily habit destroyed by rest and idleness, and
500.   preserved, generally speaking, by gymnastic exercises and motions?
501.   THEAETETUS: Yes.
502.   SOCRATES: And what of the habit of the soul? Does not the soul acquire information
503.   and is it not preserved and made better through learning and practice, which are
504.   motions, whereas through rest, which is want of practice and of study, it learns
505.   nothing and forgets what it has learned?
506.   THEAETETUS: Certainly.
507.   SOCRATES: Then the good, both for the soul and for the body, is motion, and rest is
508.   the opposite?
509.   THEAETETUS: Apparently.
510.   SOCRATES: Now shall I go on and mention to you also windless air, calm sea, and all
511.   that sort of thing, and say that stillness causes decay and destruction and that the
512.   opposite brings preservation? And shall I add to this the all-compelling and
513.   crowning argument that Homer by “the golden chain” refers to nothing else than the
514.   sun, and means that so long as the heavens and the sun go round everything exists
515.   and is preserved, among both gods and men, but if the motion should stop, as if
516.   bound fast, everything would be destroyed and would, as the saying is, be turned
517.   upside down?
518.   THEAETETUS: Yes, Socrates, I think he means what you say he does.
519.   SOCRATES: Then, my friend, you must apply the doctrine in this way: first as
520.   concerns vision, the color that you call white is not to be taken as something
521.   separate outside of your eyes, nor yet as something inside of them; and you must not
522.   assign any place to it, for then it would at once be in a definite position and
523.   stationary and would have no part in the process of becoming.
524.   THEAETETUS: But what do you mean?
525.   SOCRATES: Let us stick close to the statement we made a moment ago, and assume that
526.   nothing exists by itself as invariably one: then it will be apparent that black or
527.   white or any other color whatsoever is the result of the impact of the eye upon the
528.   appropriate motion, and therefore that which we call color will be in each instance
529.   neither that which impinges nor that which is impinged upon, but something between,
530.   which has occurred, peculiar to each individual. Or would you maintain that each
531.   color appears to a dog, or any other animal you please, just as it does to you?
532.   THEAETETUS: No, by Zeus, I wouldn't.
533.   SOCRATES: Well, does anything whatsoever appear the same to any other man as to you?
534.   Are you sure of this? Or are you not much more convinced that nothing appears the
535.   same even to you, because you yourself are never exactly the same?
536.   THEAETETUS: Yes, I am much more convinced of the last.
537.   SOCRATES: Then, if that with which I compare myself in size, or which I touch, were
538.   really large or white or hot, it would never have become different by coming in
539.   contact with something different, without itself changing; and if, on the other
540.   hand, that which did the comparing or the touching were really large or white or
541.   hot, it would not have become different when something different approached it or
542.   was affected in some way by it, without being affected in some way itself. For
543.   nowadays, my friend, we find ourselves rather easily forced to make extraordinary
544.   and absurd statements, as Protagoras and everyone who undertakes to agree with him
545.   would say.
546.   THEAETETUS: What do you mean? What statements?
547.   SOCRATES: Take a little example and you will know all I have in mind. Given six
548.   dice, for instance, if you compare four with them, we say that they are more than
549.   the four, half as many again, but if you compare twelve with them, we say they are
550.   less, half as many; and any other statement would be inadmissible; or would you
551.   admit any other?
552.   THEAETETUS: Not I.
553.   SOCRATES: Well then, if Protagoras, or anyone else, ask you, “Theaetetus, can
554.   anything become greater or more in any other way than by being increased?” what
555.   reply will you make?
556.   THEAETETUS: If I am to say what I think, Socrates, with reference to the present
557.   question, I should say “no,” but if I consider the earlier question, I should say
558.   “yes,” for fear of contradicting myself.
559.   SOCRATES: Good, by Hera! Excellent, my friend! But apparently, if you answer “yes”
560.   it will be in the Euripidean spirit; for our tongue will be unconvinced, but not our
561.   mind.
562.   THEAETETUS: True.
563.   SOCRATES: Well, if you and I were clever and wise and had found out everything about
564.   the mind, we should henceforth spend the rest of our time testing each other out of
565.   the fulness of our wisdom, rushing together like sophists in a sophistical combat,
566.   battering each other's arguments with counter arguments. But, as it is, since we are
567.   ordinary people, we shall wish in the first place to look into the real essence of
568.   our thoughts and see whether they harmonize with one another or not at all.
569.   THEAETETUS: Certainly that is what I should like.
570.   SOCRATES: And so should I. But since this is the case, and we have plenty of time,
571.   shall we not quietly, without any impatience, but truly examining ourselves,
572.   consider again the nature of these appearances within us? And as we consider them, I
573.   shall say, I think, first, that nothing can ever become more or less in size or
574.   number, so long as it remains equal to itself. Is it not so?
575.   THEAETETUS: Yes.
576.   SOCRATES: And secondly, that anything to which nothing is added and from which
577.   nothing is subtracted, is neither increased nor diminished, but is always equal.
578.   THEAETETUS: Certainly.
579.   SOCRATES: And should we not say thirdly, that what was not previously could not
580.   afterwards be without becoming and having become?
581.   THEAETETUS: Yes, I agree.
582.   SOCRATES: These three assumptions contend with one another in our minds when we talk
583.   about the dice, or when we say that I, who do not, at my age, either increase in
584.   size or diminish, am in the course of a year first larger than you, who are young,
585.   and afterwards smaller, when nothing has been taken from my size, but you have
586.   grown. For I am, it seems, afterwards what I was not before, and I have not become
587.   so; for it is impossible to have become without becoming, and without losing
588.   anything of my size I could not become smaller. And there are countless myriads of
589.   such contradictions, if we are to accept these that I have mentioned. You follow me,
590.   I take it, Theaetetus, for I think you are not new at such things.
591.   THEAETETUS: By the gods, Socrates, I am lost in wonder when I think of all these
592.   things, and sometimes when I regard them it really makes my head swim.
593.   SOCRATES: Theodorus seems to be a pretty good guesser about your nature. For this
594.   feeling of wonder shows that you are a philosopher, since wonder is the only
595.   beginning of philosophy, and he who said that Iris was the child of Thaumas made a
596.   good genealogy. But do you begin to understand why these things are so, according to
597.   the doctrine we attribute to Protagoras, or do you not as yet?
598.   THEAETETUS: Not yet, I think.
599.   SOCRATES: And will you be grateful to me if I help you to search out the hidden
600.   truth of the thought of a famous man or, I should say, of famous men?
601.   THEAETETUS: Of course I shall be grateful, very grateful.
602.   SOCRATES: Look round and see that none of the uninitiated is listening. The
603.   uninitiated are those who think nothing is except what they can grasp firmly with
604.   their hands, and who deny the existence of actions and generation and all that is
605.   invisible.
606.   THEAETETUS: Truly, Socrates, those you speak of are very stubborn and perverse
607.   mortals.
608.   SOCRATES: So they are, my boy, quite without culture. But others are more clever,
609.   whose secret doctrines I am going to disclose to you. For them the beginning, upon
610.   which all the things we were just now speaking of depend, is the assumption that
611.   everything is real motion and that there is nothing besides this, but that there are
612.   two kinds of motion, each infinite in the number of its manifestations, and of these
613.   kinds one has an active, the other a passive force. From the union and friction of
614.   these two are born offspring, infinite in number, but always twins, the object of
615.   sense and the sense which is always born and brought forth together with the object
616.   of sense. Now we give the senses names like these: sight and hearing and smell, and
617.   the sense of cold and of heat, and pleasures and pains and desires and fears and so
618.   forth. Those that have names are very numerous, and those that are unnamed are
619.   innumerable. Now the class of objects of sense is akin to each of these; all sorts
620.   of colors are akin to all sorts of acts of vision, and in the same way sounds to
621.   acts of hearing, and the other objects of sense spring forth akin to the other
622.   senses. What does this tale mean for us, Theaetetus, with reference to what was said
623.   before? Do you see?
624.   THEAETETUS: Not quite, Socrates.
625.   SOCRATES: Just listen; perhaps we can finish the tale. It means, of course, that all
626.   these things are, as we were saying, in motion, and their motion has in it either
627.   swiftness or slowness. Now the slow element keeps its motion in the same place and
628.   directed towards such things as draw near it, and indeed it is in this way that it
629.   begets. But the things begotten in this way are quicker; for they move from one
630.   place to another, and their motion is naturally from one place to another. Now when
631.   the eye and some appropriate object which approaches beget whiteness and the
632.   corresponding perception—which could never have been produced by either of them
633.   going to anything else—then, while sight from the eye and whiteness from that which
634.   helps to produce the color are moving from one to the other, the eye becomes full of
635.   sight and so begins at that moment to see, and becomes, certainly not sight, but a
636.   seeing eye, and the object which joined in begetting the color is filled with
637.   whiteness and becomes in its turn, not whiteness, but white, whether it be a stick
638.   or a stone, or whatever it be the hue of which is so colored. And all the rest—hard
639.   and hot and so forth—must be regarded in the same way: we must assume, we said
640.   before, that nothing exists in itself, but all things of all sorts arise out of
641.   motion by intercourse with each other; for it is, as they say, impossible to form a
642.   firm conception of the active or the passive element as being anything separately;
643.   for there is no active element until there is a union with the passive element, nor
644.   is there a passive element until there is a union with the active; and that which
645.   unites with one thing is active and appears again as passive when it comes in
646.   contact with something else. And so it results from all this, as we said in the
647.   beginning, that nothing exists as invariably one, itself by itself, but everything
648.   is always becoming in relation to something, and “being” should be altogether
649.   abolished, though we have often—and even just now—been compelled by custom and
650.   ignorance to use the word. But we ought not, the wise men say, to permit the use of
651.   “something” or “somebody's” or “mine” or “this” or “that” or any other word that
652.   implies making things stand still, but in accordance with nature we should speak of
653.   things as “becoming” and “being made” and “being destroyed” and “changing”; for
654.   anyone who by his mode of speech makes things stand still is easily refuted. And we
655.   must use such expressions in relation both to particular objects and collective
656.   designations, among which are “mankind” and “stone” and the names of every animal
657.   and class. Do these doctrines seem pleasant to you, Theaetetus, and do you find
658.   their taste agreeable?
659.   THEAETETUS: I don't know, Socrates; besides, I can't tell about you, either, whether
660.   you are preaching them because you believe them or to test me.
661.   SOCRATES: You forget, my friend, that I myself know nothing about such things, and
662.   claim none of them as mine, but am incapable of bearing them and am merely acting as
663.   a midwife to you, and for that reason am uttering incantations and giving you a
664.   taste of each of the philosophical theories, until I may help to bring your own
665.   opinion to light. And when it is brought to light, I will examine it and see whether
666.   it is a mere wind-egg or a real offspring. So be brave and patient, and in good and
667.   manly fashion tell what you think in reply to my questions.
668.   THEAETETUS: Very well; ask them.
669.   SOCRATES: Then say once more whether the doctrine pleases you that nothing is, but
670.   is always becoming—good or beautiful or any of the other qualities we were just
671.   enumerating.
672.   THEAETETUS: Why, when I hear you telling about it as you did, it seems to me that it
673.   is wonderfully reasonable and ought to be accepted as you have presented it.
674.   SOCRATES: Let us, then, not neglect a point in which it is defective. The defect is
675.   found in connection with dreams and diseases, including insanity, and everything
676.   else that is said to cause illusions of sight and hearing and the other senses. For
677.   of course you know that in all these the doctrine we were just presenting seems
678.   admittedly to be refuted, because. in them we certainly have false perceptions, and
679.   it is by no means true that everything is to each man which appears to him; on the
680.   contrary, nothing is which appears.
681.   THEAETETUS: What you say is very true, Socrates.
682.   SOCRATES: What argument is left, then, my boy, for the man who says that perception
683.   is knowledge and that in each case the things which appear are to the one to whom
684.   they appear?
685.   THEAETETUS: I hesitate to say, Socrates, that I have no reply to make, because you
686.   scolded me just now when I said that. But really I cannot dispute that those who are
687.   insane or dreaming have false opinions, when some of them think they are gods and
688.   others fancy in their sleep that they have wings and are flying.
689.   SOCRATES: Don't you remember, either, the similar dispute about these errors,
690.   especially about sleeping and waking?
691.   THEAETETUS: What dispute?
692.   SOCRATES: One which I fancy you have often heard. The question is asked, what proof
693.   you could give if anyone should ask us now, at the present moment, whether we are
694.   asleep and our thoughts are a dream, or whether we are awake and talking with each
695.   other in a waking condition.
696.   THEAETETUS: Really, Socrates, I don't see what proof can be given; for there is an
697.   exact correspondence in all particulars, as between the strophe and antistrophe of a
698.   choral song. Take, for instance, the conversation we have just had: there is nothing
699.   to prevent us from imagining in our sleep also that we are carrying on this
700.   conversation with each other, and when in a dream we imagine that we are relating
701.   dreams, the likeness between the one talk and the other is remarkable.
702.   SOCRATES: So you see it is not hard to dispute the point, since it is even open to
703.   dispute whether we are awake or in a dream. Now since the time during which we are
704.   asleep is equal to that during which we are awake, in each state our spirit contends
705.   that the semblances that appear to it at any time are certainly true, so that for
706.   half the time we say that this is true, and for half the time the other, and we
707.   maintain each with equal confidence.
708.   THEAETETUS: Certainly.
709.   SOCRATES: And may not, then, the same be said about insanity and the other diseases,
710.   except that the time is not equal?
711.   THEAETETUS: Yes.
712.   SOCRATES: Well, then, shall truth be determined by the length or shortness of time?
713.   THEAETETUS: That would be absurd in many ways.
714.   SOCRATES: But can you show clearly in any other way which of the two sets of
715.   opinions is true?
716.   THEAETETUS: I do not think I can.
717.   SOCRATES: Listen, then, while I tell you what would be said about them by those who
718.   maintain that what appears at any time is true for him to whom it appears. They
719.   begin, I imagine, by asking this question: “Theaetetus, can that which is wholly
720.   other have in any way the same quality as its alternative? And we must not assume
721.   that the thing in question is partially the same and partially other, but wholly
722.   other.”
723.   THEAETETUS: It is impossible for it to be the same in anything, either in quality.
724.   or in any other respect whatsoever, when it is wholly other.
725.   SOCRATES: Must we not, then, necessarily agree that such a thing is also unlike?
726.   THEAETETUS: It seems so to me.
727.   SOCRATES: Then if anything happens to become like or unlike anything—either itself
728.   or anything else—we shall say that when it becomes like it becomes the same, and
729.   when it becomes unlike it becomes other?
730.   THEAETETUS: We must.
731.   SOCRATES: Well, we said before, did we not, that the active elements were many—
732.   infinite in fact—and likewise the passive elements?
733.   THEAETETUS: Yes.
734.   SOCRATES: And furthermore, that any given element, by uniting at different times
735.   with different partners, will beget, not the same, but other results?
736.   THEAETETUS: Certainly.
737.   SOCRATES: Well, then, let us take me, or you, or anything else at hand, and apply
738.   the same principle—say Socrates in health and Socrates in illness. Shall we say the
739.   one is like the other, or unlike?
740.   THEAETETUS: When you say “Socrates in illness” do you mean to compare that Socrates
741.   as a whole with Socrates in health as a whole?
742.   SOCRATES: You understand perfectly; that is just what I mean.
743.   THEAETETUS: Unlike, I imagine.
744.   SOCRATES: And therefore other, inasmuch as unlike?
745.   THEAETETUS: Necessarily.
746.   SOCRATES: And you would say the same of Socrates asleep or in any of the other
747.   states we enumerated just now?
748.   THEAETETUS: Yes.
749.   SOCRATES: Then each of those elements which by the law of their nature act upon
750.   something else, will, when it gets hold of Socrates in health, find me one object to
751.   act upon, and when it gets hold of me in illness, another?
752.   THEAETETUS: How can it help it?
753.   SOCRATES: And so, in the two cases, that active element and I, who am the passive
754.   element, shall each produce a different object?
755.   THEAETETUS: Of course.
756.   SOCRATES: So, then, when I am in health and drink wine, it seems pleasant and sweet
757.   to me?
758.   THEAETETUS: Yes.
759.   SOCRATES: The reason is, in fact, that according to the principles we accepted a
760.   while ago, the active and passive elements produce sweetness and perception, both of
761.   which are simultaneously moving from one place to another, and the perception, which
762.   comes from the passive element, makes the tongue perceptive, and the sweetness,
763.   which comes from the wine and pervades it, passes over and makes the wine both to be
764.   and to seem sweet to the tongue that is in health.
765.   THEAETETUS: Certainly, such are the principles we accepted a while ago.
766.   SOCRATES: But when it gets hold of me in illness, in the first place, it really
767.   doesn't get hold of the same man, does it? For he to whom it comes is certainly
768.   unlike.
769.   THEAETETUS: True.
770.   SOCRATES: Therefore the union of the Socrates who is ill and the draught of wine
771.   produces other results: in the tongue the sensation or perception of bitterness, and
772.   in the wine—a bitterness which is engendered there and passes over into the other;
773.   the wine is made, not bitterness, but bitter, and I am made, not perception, but
774.   perceptive.
775.   THEAETETUS: Certainly.
776.   SOCRATES: Then I shall never have this perception of any other thing; for a
777.   perception of another thing is another perception, and makes the percipient
778.   different and other: nor can that which acts on me ever by union with another
779.   produce the same result or become the same in kind; for by producing another result
780.   from another passive element it will become different in kind.
781.   THEAETETUS: That is true.
782.   SOCRATES: And neither shall I, furthermore, ever again become the same as I am, nor
783.   will that ever become the same as it is.
784.   THEAETETUS: No.
785.   SOCRATES: And yet, when I become percipient, I must necessarily become percipient of
786.   something, for it is impossible to become percipient and perceive nothing; and that
787.   which is perceived must become so to someone, when it becomes sweet or bitter or the
788.   like; for to become sweet, but sweet to no one, is impossible.
789.   THEAETETUS: Perfectly true.
790.   SOCRATES: The result, then, I think, is that we (the active and the passive
791.   elements) are or become, whichever is the case, in relation to one another, since we
792.   are bound to one another by the inevitable law of our being, but to nothing else,
793.   not even to ourselves. The result, then, is that we are bound to one another; and so
794.   if a man says anything “is,” he must say it is to or of or in relation to something,
795.   and similarly if he says it “becomes”; but he must not say it is or becomes
796.   absolutely, nor can he accept such a statement from anyone else. That is the meaning
797.   of the doctrine we have been describing.
798.   THEAETETUS: Yes, quite so, Socrates.
799.   SOCRATES: Then, since that which acts on me is to me and to me only, it is also the
800.   case that I perceive it, and I only?
801.   THEAETETUS: Of course.
802.   SOCRATES: Then to me my perception is true; for in each case it is always part of my
803.   being; and I am, as Protagoras says, the judge of the existence of the things that
804.   are to me and of the non-existence of those that are not to me.
805.   THEAETETUS: So it seems.
806.   SOCRATES: How, then, if I am an infallible judge and my mind never stumbles in
807.   regard to the things that are or that become, can I fail to know that which I
808.   perceive?
809.   THEAETETUS: You cannot possibly fail.
810.   SOCRATES: Therefore you were quite right in saying that knowledge is nothing else
811.   than perception, and there is complete identity between the doctrine of Homer and
812.   Heracleitus and all their followers—that all things are in motion, like streams—the
813.   doctrine of the great philosopher Protagoras that man is the measure of all things—
814.   and the doctrine of Theaetetus that, ince these things are true, perception is
815.   knowledge. Eh, Theaetetus? Shall we say that this is, so to speak, your new-born
816.   child and the result of my midwifery? Or what shall we say?
817.   THEAETETUS: We must say that, Socrates.
818.   SOCRATES: Well, we have at last managed to bring this forth, whatever it turns out
819.   to be; and now that it is born, we must in very truth perform the rite of running
820.   round with it in a circle— the circle of our argument—and see whether it may not
821.   turn out to be after all not worth rearing, but only a wind-egg, an imposture. But,
822.   perhaps, you think that any offspring of yours ought to be cared for and not put
823.   away; or will you bear to see it examined and not get angry if it is taken away from
824.   you, though it is your first-born?
825.   THEODORUS: Theaetetus will bear it, Socrates, for he is not at all ill-tempered. But
826.   for heaven's sake, Socrates, tell me, is all this wrong after all?
827.   SOCRATES: You are truly fond of argument, Theodorus, and a very good fellow to think
828.   that I am a sort of bag full of arguments and can easily pull one out and say that
829.   after all the other one was wrong; but you do not understand what is going on: none
830.   of the arguments comes from me, but always from him who is talking with me. I myself
831.   know nothing, except just a little, enough to extract an argument from another man
832.   who is wise and to receive it fairly. And now I will try to extract this thought
833.   from Theaetetus, but not to say anything myself.
834.   THEODORUS: That is the better way, Socrates; do as you say.
835.   SOCRATES: Do you know, then, Theodorus, what amazes me in your friend Protagoras?
836.   THEODORUS: What is it?
837.   SOCRATES: In general I like his doctrine that what appears to each one is to him,
838.   but I am amazed by the beginning of his book. I don't see why he does not say in the
839.   beginning of his Truth that a pig or a dog-faced baboon or some still
840.   stranger creature of those that have sensations is the measure of all things. Then
841.   he might have begun to speak to us very imposingly and condescendingly, showing that
842.   while we were honoring him like a god for his wisdom, he was after all no better in
843.   intellect than any other man, or, for that matter, than a tadpole. What alternative
844.   is there, Theodorus? For if that opinion is true to each person which he acquires
845.   through sensation, and no one man can discern another's condition better than he
846.   himself, and one man has no better right to investigate whether another's opinion is
847.   true or false than he himself, but, as we have said several times, each man is to
848.   form his own opinions by himself, and these opinions are always right and true, why
849.   in the world, my friend, was Protagoras wise, so that he could rightly be thought
850.   worthy to be the teacher of other men and to be well paid, and why were we ignorant
851.   creatures and obliged to go to school to him, if each person is the measure of his
852.   own wisdom? Must we not believe that Protagoras was “playing to the gallery” in
853.   saying this? I say nothing of the ridicule that I and my science of midwifery
854.   deserve in that case,—and, I should say, the whole practice of dialectics, too. For
855.   would not the investigation of one another's fancies and opinions, and the attempt
856.   to refute them, when each man's must be right, be tedious and blatant folly, if the
857.   Truth of Protagoras is true and he was not jesting when he uttered his
858.   oracles from the shrine of his book?
859.   THEODORUS: Socrates, the man was my friend, as you just remarked. So I should hate
860.   to bring about the refutation of Protagoras by agreeing with you, and I should hate
861.   also to oppose you contrary to my real convictions. So take Theaetetus again;
862.   especially as he seemed just now to follow your suggestions very carefully.
863.   SOCRATES: If you went to Sparta, Theodorus, and visited the wrestling-schools, would
864.   you think it fair to look on at other people naked, some of whom were of poor
865.   physique, without stripping and showing your own form, too?
866.   THEODORUS: Why not, if I could persuade them to allow me to do so? So now I think I
867.   shall persuade you to let me be a spectator, and not to drag me into the ring, since
868.   I am old and stiff, but to take the younger and nimbler man as your antagonist.
869.   SOCRATES: Well, Theodorus, if that pleases you, it does not displease me, as the
870.   saying is. So I must attack the wise Theaetetus again. Tell me, Theaetetus,
871.   referring to the doctrine we have just expounded, do you not share my amazement at
872.   being suddenly exalted to an equality with the wisest man, or even god? Or do you
873.   think Protagoras's “measure” applies any less to gods than to men?
874.   THEAETETUS: By no means; and I am amazed that you ask such a question at all; for
875.   when we were discussing the meaning of the doctrine that whatever appears to each
876.   one really is to him, I thought it was good; but now it has suddenly changed to the
877.   opposite.
878.   SOCRATES: You are young, my dear boy; so you are quickly moved and swayed by popular
879.   oratory. For in reply to what I have said, Protagoras, or someone speaking for him,
880.   will say, “Excellent boys and old men, there you sit together declaiming to the
881.   people, and you bring in the gods, the question of whose existence or non-existence
882.   I exclude from oral and written discussion, and you say the sort of thing that the
883.   crowd would readily accept—that it is a terrible thing if every man is to be no
884.   better than any beast in point of wisdom; but you do not advance any cogent proof
885.   whatsoever; you base your statements on probability. If Theodorus, or any other
886.   geometrician, should base his geometry on probability, he would be of no account at
887.   all. So you and Theodorus had better consider whether you will accept arguments
888.   founded on plausibility and probabilities in. uch important matters.”
889.   THEAETETUS: That would not be right, Socrates; neither you nor we would think so.
890.   SOCRATES: Apparently, then, you and Theodorus mean we must look at the matter in a
891.   different way.
892.   THEAETETUS: Yes, certainly in a different way.
893.   SOCRATES: Well, then, let us look at it in this way, raising the question whether
894.   knowledge is after all the same as perception, or different. For that is the object
895.   of all our discussion, and it was to answer that question than we stirred up all
896.   these strange doctrines, was it not?
897.   THEAETETUS: Most assuredly.
898.   SOCRATES: Shall we then agree that all that we perceive by sight or hearing we know?
899.   For instance, shall we say that before having learned the language of foreigners we
900.   do not hear them when they speak, or that we both hear and know what they say? And
901.   again, if we do not know the letters, shall we maintain that we do not see them when
902.   we look at them or that if we really see them we know them?
903.   THEAETETUS: We shall say, Socrates, that we know just so much of them as we hear or
904.   see: in the case of the letters, we both see and know the form and color, and in the
905.   spoken language we both hear and at the same time know the higher and lower notes of
906.   the voice; but we do not perceive through sight or hearing, and we do not know, what
907.   the grammarians and interpreters teach about them.
908.   SOCRATES: First-rate, Theaetetus! and it is a pity to dispute that, for I want you
909.   to grow. But look out for another trouble that is yonder coming towards us, and see
910.   how we can repel it.
911.   THEAETETUS: What is it?
912.   SOCRATES: It is like this: If anyone should ask, “Is it possible, if a man has ever
913.   known a thing and still has and preserves a memory of that thing, that he does not,
914.   at the time when he remembers, know that very thing which he remembers?” I seem to
915.   be pretty long winded; but I merely want to ask if a man who has learned a thing
916.   does not know it when he remembers it.
917.   THEAETETUS: Of course he does, Socrates; for what you suggest would be monstrous.
918.   SOCRATES: Am I crazy, then? Look here. Do you not say that seeing is perceiving and
919.   that sight is perception?
920.   THEAETETUS: I do.
921.   SOCRATES: Then, according to what we have just said, the man who has seen a thing
922.   has acquired knowledge of that which he has seen?
923.   THEAETETUS: Yes.
924.   SOCRATES: Well, then, do you not admit that there is such a thing as memory?
925.   THEAETETUS: Yes.
926.   SOCRATES: Memory of nothing or of something?
927.   THEAETETUS: Of something, surely.
928.   SOCRATES: Of things he has learned and perceived—that sort of things?
929.   THEAETETUS: Of course.
930.   SOCRATES: A man sometimes remembers what he has seen, does he not?
931.   THEAETETUS: He does.
932.   SOCRATES: Even when he shuts his eyes, or does he forget if he does that?
933.   THEAETETUS: It would be absurd to say that, Socrates..
934.   SOCRATES: We must, though, if we are to maintain our previous argument; otherwise,
935.   it is all up with it.
936.   THEAETETUS: I too, by Zeus, have my suspicions, but I don't fully understand you.
937.   Tell me how it is.
938.   SOCRATES: This is how it is: he who sees has acquired knowledge, we say, of that
939.   which he has seen; for it is agreed that sight and perception and knowledge are all
940.   the same.
941.   THEAETETUS: Certainly.
942.   SOCRATES: But he who has seen and has acquired knowledge of what he saw, if he shuts
943.   his eyes, remembers it, but does not see it. Is that right?
944.   THEAETETUS: Yes.
945.   SOCRATES: But “does not see” is the same as “does not know,” if it is true that
946.   seeing is knowing.
947.   THEAETETUS: True.
948.   SOCRATES: Then this is our result. When a man has acquired knowledge of a thing and
949.   still remembers it, he does not know it, since he does not see it; but we said that
950.   would be a monstrous conclusion.
951.   THEAETETUS: Very true.
952.   SOCRATES: So, evidently, we reach an impossible result if we say that knowledge and
953.   perception are the same.
954.   THEAETETUS: So it seems.
955.   SOCRATES: Then we must say they are different.
956.   THEAETETUS: I suppose so.
957.   SOCRATES: Then what can knowledge be? We must, apparently, begin our discussion all
958.   over again. And yet, Theaetetus, what are we on the point of doing?
959.   THEAETETUS: About what?
960.   SOCRATES: It seems to me that we are behaving like a worthless game-cock; before
961.   winning the victory we have leapt away from our argument and begun to crow.
962.   THEAETETUS: How so?
963.   SOCRATES: We seem to be acting like professional debaters; we have based our
964.   agreements on the mere similarity of words and are satisfied to have got the better
965.   of the argument in such a way, and we do not see that we, who claim to be, not
966.   contestants for a prize, but lovers of wisdom, are doing just what those ingenious
967.   persons do.
968.   THEAETETUS: I do not yet understand what you mean.
969.   SOCRATES: Well, I will try to make my thought clear. We asked, you recollect,
970.   whether a man who has learned something and remembers it does not know it. We showed
971.   first that the one who has seen and then shuts his eyes remembers, although he does
972.   not see, and then we showed that he does not know, although at the same time he
973.   remembers; but this, we said, was impossible. And so the Protagorean tale was
974.   brought to naught, and yours also about the identity of knowledge and perception.
975.   THEAETETUS: Evidently.
976.   SOCRATES: It would not be so, I fancy, my friend, if the father of the first of the
977.   two tales were alive; he would have had a good deal to say in its defence. But he is
978.   dead, and we are abusing the orphan. Why, even the guardians whom Protagoras left—
979.   one of whom is Theodorus here—are unwilling to come to the child's assistance. So it
980.   seems that we shall have to do it ourselves, assisting him in the name of justice.
981.   THEODORUS: Do so, for it is not I, Socrates, but rather. Callias the son of
982.   Hipponicus, who is the guardian of his children. As for me, I turned rather too soon
983.   from abstract speculations to geometry. However, I shall be grateful to you if you
984.   come to his assistance.
985.   SOCRATES: Good, Theodorus! Now see how I shall help him; for a man might find
986.   himself involved in still worse inconsistencies than those in which we found
987.   ourselves just now, if he did not pay attention to the terms which we generally use
988.   in assent and denial. Shall I explain this to you, or only to Theaetetus?
989.   THEODORUS: To both of us, but let the younger answer; for he will be less disgraced
990.   if he is discomfited.
991.   SOCRATES: Very well; now I am going to ask the most frightfully difficult question
992.   of all. It runs, I believe, something like this: Is it possible for a person, if he
993.   knows a thing, at the same time not to know that which he knows?
994.   THEODORUS: Now, then, what shall we answer, Theaetetus?
995.   THEAETETUS: It is impossible, I should think.
996.   SOCRATES: Not if you make seeing and knowing identical. For what will you do with a
997.   question from which there is no escape, by which you are, as the saying is, caught
998.   in a pit, when your adversary, unabashed, puts his hand over one of your eyes and
999.   asks if you see his cloak with the eye that is covered?
1000. THEAETETUS: I shall say, I think, “Not with that eye, but with the other.”
1001. SOCRATES: Then you see and do not see the same thing at the same time?
1002. THEAETETUS: After a fashion.
1003. SOCRATES: “That,” he will reply, “is not at all what I want, and I did not ask about
1004. the fashion, but whether you both know and do not know the same thing. Now
1005. manifestly you see that which you do not see. But you have agreed that seeing is
1006. knowing and not seeing is not knowing. Very well; from all this, reckon out what the
1007. result is.”
1008. THEAETETUS: Well, I reckon out that the result is the contrary of my hypothesis.
1009. SOCRATES: And perhaps, my fine fellow, more troubles of the same sort might have
1010. come upon you, if anyone asked you further questions—whether it is possible to know
1011. the same thing both sharply and dully, to know close at hand but not at a distance,
1012. to know both violently and gently, and countless other questions, such as a nimble
1013. fighter, fighting for pay in the war of words, might have lain in wait and asked
1014. you, when you said that knowledge and perception were the same thing; he would have
1015. charged down upon hearing and smelling and such senses, and would have argued
1016. persistently and unceasingly until you were filled with admiration of his greatly
1017. desired wisdom and were taken in his toils, and then, after subduing and binding you
1018. he would at once proceed to bargain with you for such ransom as might be agreed upon
1019. between you. What argument, then, you might ask, will Protagoras produce to
1020. strengthen his forces? Shall we try to carry on the discussion?
1021. THEAETETUS: By all means.
1022. SOCRATES: He will, I fancy, say all that we have said in his defence. and then will
1023. close with us, saying contemptuously, “Our estimable Socrates here frightened a
1024. little boy by asking if it was possible for one and the same person to remember and
1025. at the same time not to know one and the same thing, and when the child in his
1026. fright said 'no,' because he could not foresee what would result, Socrates made poor
1027. me a laughing-stock in his talk. But, you slovenly Socrates, the facts stand thus:
1028. when you examine any doctrine of mine by the method of questioning, if the person
1029. who is questioned makes such replies as I should make and comes to grief, then I am
1030. refuted, but if his replies are quite different, then the person questioned is
1031. refuted, not I. Take this example. Do you suppose you could get anybody to admit
1032. that the memory a man has of a past feeling he no longer feels is anything like the
1033. feeling at the time when he was feeling it? Far from it. Or that he would refuse to
1034. admit that it is possible for one and the same person to know and not to know one
1035. and the same thing? Or if he were afraid to admit this, would he ever admit that a
1036. person who has become unlike is the same as before he became unlike? In fact, if we
1037. are to be on our guard against such verbal entanglements, would he admit that a
1038. person is one at all, and not many, who become infinite in number, if the process of
1039. becoming different continues? But, my dear fellow,” he will say, “attack my real
1040. doctrines in a more generous manner, and prove, if you can, that perceptions, when
1041. they come, or become, to each of us, are not individual, or that, if they are
1042. individual, what appears to each one would not, for all that, become to that one
1043. alone—or, if you prefer to say 'be,' would not be—to whom it appears. But when you
1044. talk of pigs and dog-faced baboons, you not only act like a pig yourself, but you
1045. persuade your hearers to act so toward my writings, and that is not right. For I
1046. maintain that the truth is as I have written; each one of us is the measure of the
1047. things that are and those that are not; but each person differs immeasurably from
1048. every other in just this, that to one person some things appear and are, and to
1049. another person other things. And I do not by any means say that wisdom and the wise
1050. man do not exist; on the contrary, I say that if bad things appear and are to any
1051. one of us, precisely that man is wise who causes a change and makes good things
1052. appear and be to him. And, moreover, do not lay too much stress upon the words of my
1053. argument, but get a clearer understanding of my meaning from what I am going to say.
1054. Recall to your mind what was said before, that his food appears and is bitter to the
1055. sick man, but appears and is the opposite of bitter to the man in health. Now
1056. neither of these two is to be made wiser than he is—that is not possible—. nor
1057. should the claim be made that the sick man is ignorant because his opinions are
1058. ignorant, or the healthy man wise because his are different; but a change must be
1059. made from the one condition to the other, for the other is better. So, too, in
1060. education a change has to be made from a worse to a better condition; but the
1061. physician causes the change by means of drugs, and the teacher of wisdom by means of
1062. words. And yet, in fact, no one ever made anyone think truly who previously thought
1063. falsely, since it is impossible to think that which is not or to think any other
1064. things than those which one feels; and these are always true. But I believe that a
1065. man who, on account of a bad condition of soul, thinks thoughts akin to that
1066. condition, is made by a good condition of soul to think correspondingly good
1067. thoughts; and some men, through inexperience, call these appearances true, whereas I
1068. call them better than the others, but in no wise truer. And the wise, my dear
1069. Socrates, I do not by any means call tadpoles when they have to do with the human
1070. body, I call them physicians, and when they have to do with plants, husbandmen; for
1071. I assert that these latter, when plants are sickly, instil into them good and
1072. healthy sensations, and true ones instead of bad sensations, and that the wise and
1073. good orators make the good, instead of the evil, seem to be right to their states.
1074. For I claim that whatever seems right and honorable to a state is really right and
1075. honorable to it, so long as it believes it to be so; but the wise man causes the
1076. good, instead of that which is evil to them in each instance, to be and seem right
1077. and honorable. And on the same principle the teacher who is able to train his pupils
1078. in this manner is not only wise but is also entitled to receive high pay from them
1079. when their education is finished. And in this sense it is true that some men are
1080. wiser than others, and that no one thinks falsely, and that you, whether you will or
1081. no, must endure to be a measure. Upon these positions my doctrine stands firm; and
1082. if you can dispute it in principle, dispute it by bringing an opposing doctrine
1083. against it; or if you prefer the method of questions, ask questions; for an
1084. intelligent person ought not to reject this method, on the contrary, he should
1085. choose it before all others. However, let me make a suggestion: do not be unfair in
1086. your questioning; it is very inconsistent for a man who asserts that he cares for
1087. virtue to be constantly unfair in discussion; and it is unfair in discussion when a
1088. man makes no distinction between merely trying to make points and carrying on a real
1089. argument. In the former he may jest and try to trip up his opponent as much as he
1090. can, but in real argument he must be in earnest and must set his interlocutor on his
1091. feet, pointing out to him those slips only which are due to himself and. his
1092. previous associations. For if you act in this way, those who debate with you will
1093. cast the blame for their confusion and perplexity upon themselves, not upon you;
1094. they will run after you and love you, and they will hate themselves and run away
1095. from themselves, taking refuge in philosophy, that they may escape from their former
1096. selves by becoming different. But if you act in the opposite way, as most teachers
1097. do, you will produce the opposite result, and instead of making your young
1098. associates philosophers, you will make them hate philosophy when they grow older. If
1099. therefore, you will accept the suggestion which I made before, you will avoid a
1100. hostile and combative attitude and in a gracious spirit will enter the lists with me
1101. and inquire what we really mean when we declare that all things are in motion and
1102. that whatever seems is to each individual, whether man or state. And on the basis of
1103. that you will consider the question whether knowledge and perception are the same or
1104. different, instead of doing as you did a while ago, using as your basis the ordinary
1105. meaning of names and words, which most people pervert in haphazard ways and thereby
1106. cause all sorts of perplexity in one another.” Such, Theodorus, is the help I have
1107. furnished your friend to the best of my ability—not much, for my resources are
1108. small; but if he were living himself he would have helped his offspring in a fashion
1109. more magnificent.
1110. THEODORUS: You are joking, Socrates, for you have come to the man's assistance with
1111. all the valor of youth.
1112. SOCRATES: Thank you, my friend. Tell me, did you observe just now that Protagoras
1113. reproached us for addressing our words to a boy, and said that we made the boy's
1114. timidity aid us in our argument against his doctrine, and that he called our
1115. procedure a mere display of wit, solemnly insisting upon the importance of “the
1116. measure of all things,” and urging us to treat his doctrine seriously?
1117. THEODORUS: Of course I observed it, Socrates.
1118. SOCRATES: Well then, shall we do as he says?
1119. THEODORUS: By all means.
1120. SOCRATES: Now you see that all those present, except you and myself are boys. So if
1121. we are to do as the man asks, you and I must question each other and make reply in
1122. order to show our serious attitude towards his doctrine; then he cannot, at any
1123. rate, find fault with us on the ground that we examined his doctrine in a spirit of
1124. levity with mere boys.
1125. THEODORUS: Why is this? Would not Theaetetus follow an investigation better than
1126. many a man with a long beard?
1127. SOCRATES: Yes, but not better than you, Theodorus. So you must not imagine that I
1128. have to defend your deceased friend. by any and every means, while you do nothing at
1129. all; but come, my good man, follow the discussion a little way, just until we can
1130. see whether, after all, you must be a measure in respect to diagrams, or whether all
1131. men are as sufficient unto themselves as you are in astronomy and the other sciences
1132. in which you are alleged to be superior.
1133. THEODORUS: It is not easy, Socrates, for anyone to sit beside you and not be forced
1134. to give an account of himself and it was foolish of me just now to say you would
1135. excuse me and would not oblige me, as the Lacedaemonians do, to strip; you seem to
1136. me to take rather after Sciron. For the Lacedaemonians tell people to go away or
1137. else strip, but you seem to me to play rather the role of Antaeus; for you do not
1138. let anyone go who approaches you until you have forced him to strip and wrestle with
1139. you in argument.
1140. SOCRATES: Your comparison with Sciron and Antaeus pictures my complaint admirably;
1141. only I am a more stubborn combatant than they; for many a Heracles and many a
1142. Theseus, strong men of words, have fallen in with me and belabored me mightily, but
1143. still I do not desist, such a terrible love of this kind of exercise has taken hold
1144. on me. So, now that it is your turn, do not refuse to try a bout with me; it will be
1145. good for both of us.
1146. THEODORUS: I say no more. Lead on as you like. Most assuredly I must endure
1147. whatsoever fate you spin for me, and submit to interrogation. However, I shall not
1148. be able to leave myself in your hands beyond the point you propose.
1149. SOCRATES: Even that is enough. And please be especially careful that we do not
1150. inadvertently give a playful turn to our argument and somebody reproach us again for
1151. it.
1152. THEODORUS: Rest assured that I will try so far as in me lies.
1153. SOCRATES: Let us, therefore, first take up the same question as before, and let us
1154. see whether we were right or wrong in being displeased and finding fault with the
1155. doctrine because it made each individual self-sufficient in wisdom. Protagoras
1156. granted that some persons excelled others in respect to the better and the worse,
1157. and these he said were wise, did he not?
1158. THEODORUS: Yes.
1159. SOCRATES: Now if he himself were present and could agree to this, instead of our
1160. making the concession for him in our effort to help him, there would be no need of
1161. taking up the question again or of reinforcing his argument. But, as it is, perhaps
1162. it might be said that we have no authority to make the agreement for him; therefore
1163. it is better to make the agreement still clearer on this particular point; for it
1164. makes a good deal of difference whether it is so or not.
1165. THEODORUS: That is true.
1166. SOCRATES: Let us then get the agreement in as concise a form as possible, not
1167. through others, Sciron was a mighty man who attacked all who came near him and threw
1168. them from a cliff. He was overcome by Theseus. Antaeus, a terrible giant, forced all
1169. passersby to wrestle with him. He was invincible until Heracles crushed him in his
1170. arms.. but from his own statement.
1171. THEODORUS: How?
1172. SOCRATES: In this way: He says, does he not? “that which appears to each person
1173. really is to him to whom it appears.”
1174. THEODORUS: Yes, that is what he says.
1175. SOCRATES: Well then, Protagoras, we also utter the opinions of a man, or rather, of
1176. all men, and we say that there is no one who does not think himself wiser than
1177. others in some respects and others wiser than himself in other respects; for
1178. instance, in times of greatest danger, when people are distressed in war or by
1179. diseases or at sea, they regard their commanders as gods and expect them to be their
1180. saviors, though they excel them in nothing except knowledge. And all the world of
1181. men is, I dare say, full of people seeking teachers and rulers for themselves and
1182. the animals and for human activities, and, on the other hand, of people who consider
1183. themselves qualified to teach and qualified to rule. And in all these instances we
1184. must say that men themselves believe that wisdom and ignorance exist in the world of
1185. men, must we not?
1186. THEODORUS: Yes, we must.
1187. SOCRATES: And therefore they think that wisdom is true thinking and ignorance false
1188. opinion, do they not?
1189. THEODORUS: Of course.
1190. SOCRATES: Well then, Protagoras, what shall we do about the doctrine? Shall we say
1191. that the opinions which men have are always true, or sometimes true and sometimes
1192. false? For the result of either statement is that their opinions are not always
1193. true, but may be either true or false. Just think, Theodorus, would any follower of
1194. Protagoras, or you yourself care to contend that no person thinks that another is
1195. ignorant and has false opinions?
1196. THEODORUS: No, that is incredible, Socrates.
1197. SOCRATES: And yet this is the predicament to which the doctrine that man is the
1198. measure of all things inevitably leads.
1199. THEODORUS: How so?
1200. SOCRATES: When you have come to a decision in your own mind about something, and
1201. declare your opinion to me, this opinion is, according to his doctrine, true to you;
1202. let us grant that; but may not the rest of us sit in judgement on your decision, or
1203. do we always judge that your opinion is true? Do not myriads of men on each occasion
1204. oppose their opinions to yours, believing that your judgement and belief are false?
1205. THEODORUS: Yes, by Zeus, Socrates, countless myriads in truth, as Homer says, and
1206. they give me all the trouble in the world.
1207. SOCRATES: Well then, shall we say that in such a case your opinion is true to you
1208. but false to the myriads?
1209. THEODORUS: That seems to be the inevitable deduction.
1210. SOCRATES: And what of Protagoras himself? If neither he himself thought, nor people
1211. in general think, as indeed they do not, that man is the measure of all things, is
1212. it not inevitable that the “truth” which he wrote is true to no one? But if he
1213. himself thought it was true, and people in general do not agree with him, in the
1214. first place you know that it is just so much more false than true as the number of
1215. those who do not believe it is greater than the number of those who do.
1216. THEODORUS: Necessarily, if it is to be true or false according to each individual
1217. opinion.
1218. SOCRATES: Secondly, it involves this, which is a very pretty result; he concedes
1219. about his own opinion the truth of the opinion of those who disagree with him and
1220. think that his opinion is false, since he grants that the opinions of all men are
1221. true.
1222. THEODORUS: Certainly.
1223. SOCRATES: Then would he not be conceding that his own opinion is false, if he grants
1224. that the opinion of those who think he is in error is true?
1225. THEODORUS: Necessarily.
1226. SOCRATES: But the others do not concede that they are in error, do they?
1227. THEODORUS: No, they do not.
1228. SOCRATES: And he, in turn, according to his writings, grants that this opinion also
1229. is true.
1230. THEODORUS: Evidently.
1231. SOCRATES: Then all men, beginning with Protagoras, will dispute—or rather, he will
1232. grant, after he once concedes that the opinion of the man who holds the opposite
1233. view is true—even Protagoras himself, I say, will concede that neither a dog nor any
1234. casual man is a measure of anything whatsoever that he has not learned. Is not that
1235. the case?
1236. THEODORUS: Yes.
1237. SOCRATES: Then since the “truth” of Protagoras is disputed by all, it would be true
1238. to nobody, neither to anyone else nor to him.
1239. THEODORUS: I think, Socrates, we are running my friend too hard.
1240. SOCRATES: But, my dear man, I do not see that we are running beyond what is right.
1241. Most likely, though, he, being older, is wiser than we, and if, for example, he
1242. should emerge from the ground, here at our feet, if only as far as the neck, he
1243. would prove abundantly that I was making a fool of myself by my talk, in all
1244. probability, and you by agreeing with me; then he would sink down and be off at a
1245. run. But we, I suppose, must depend on ourselves, such as we are, and must say just
1246. what we think. And so now must we not say that everybody would agree that some men
1247. are wiser and some more ignorant than others?
1248. THEODORUS: Yes, I think at least we must.
1249. SOCRATES: And do you think his doctrine might stand most firmly in the form in which
1250. we sketched it when defending Protagoras, that most things—hot, dry, sweet, and
1251. everything of that sort—are to each person as they appear to him, and if Protagoras
1252. is to concede that there are cases in which one person excels another, he might be
1253. willing to say that in matters of health and disease not every woman or child—or
1254. beast, for that matter—knows what is wholesome for it and is able to cure itself,
1255. but in this point, if in any, one person excels another?
1256. THEODORUS: Yes, I think that is correct..
1257. SOCRATES: And likewise in affairs of state, the honorable and disgraceful, the just
1258. and unjust, the pious and its opposite, are in truth to each state such as it thinks
1259. they are and as it enacts into law for itself, and in these matters no citizen and
1260. no state is wiser than another; but in making laws that are advantageous to the
1261. state, or the reverse, Protagoras again will agree that one counsellor is better
1262. than another, and the opinion of one state better than that of another as regards
1263. the truth, and he would by no means dare to affirm that whatsoever laws a state
1264. makes in the belief that they will be advantageous to itself are perfectly sure to
1265. prove advantageous. But in the other class of things—I mean just and unjust, pious
1266. and impious—they are willing to say with confidence that no one of them possesses by
1267. nature an existence of its own; on the contrary, that the common opinion becomes
1268. true at the time when it is adopted and remains true as long as it is held; this is
1269. substantially the theory of those who do not altogether affirm the doctrine of
1270. Protagoras. But, Theodorus, argument after argument, a greater one after a lesser,
1271. is overtaking us.
1272. THEODORUS: Well, Socrates, we have plenty of leisure, have we not?
1273. SOCRATES: Apparently we have. And that makes me think, my friend, as I have often
1274. done before, how natural it is that those who have spent a long time in the study of
1275. philosophy appear ridiculous when they enter the courts of law as speakers.
1276. THEODORUS: What do you mean?
1277. SOCRATES: Those who have knocked about in courts and the like from their youth up
1278. seem to me, when compared with those who have been brought up in philosophy and
1279. similar pursuits, to be as slaves in breeding compared with freemen.
1280. THEODORUS: In what way is this the case?
1281. SOCRATES: In this way: the latter always have that which you just spoke of, leisure,
1282. and they talk at their leisure in peace; just as we are now taking up argument after
1283. argument, already beginning a third, so can they, if as in our case, the new one
1284. pleases them better than that in which they are engaged; and they do not care at all
1285. whether their talk is long or short, if only they attain the truth. But the men of
1286. the other sort are always in a hurry—for the water flowing through the water-clock
1287. urges them on— and the other party in the suit does not permit them to talk about
1288. anything they please, but stands over them exercising the law's compulsion by
1289. reading the brief, from which no deviation is allowed (this is called the
1290. affidavit); and their discourse is always about a fellow slave and is addressed to a
1291. master who sits there holding some case or other in his hands; and the contests
1292. never run an indefinite course, but are always directed to the point at issue, and
1293. often the race is for the defendant's life. As a result of all this, the speakers
1294. become tense and shrewd; they know how to wheedle their master with words and gain
1295. his favor by acts; but in their souls they become small and warped. For they have
1296. been deprived of growth and straightforwardness and independence by the slavery they
1297. have endured from their youth up, for this forces them to do crooked acts by putting
1298. a great burden of fears and dangers upon their souls while these are still tender;
1299. and since they cannot bear this burden with uprightness and truth, they turn
1300. forthwith to deceit and to requiting wrong with wrong, so that they become greatly
1301. bent and stunted. Consequently they pass from youth to manhood with no soundness of
1302. mind in them, but they think they have become clever and wise. So much for them,
1303. Theodorus. Shall we describe those who belong to our band, or shall we let that go
1304. and return to the argument, in order to avoid abuse of that freedom and variety of
1305. discourse, of which we were speaking just now?
1306. THEODORUS: By all means, Socrates, describe them; for I like your saying that we who
1307. belong to this band are not the servants of our arguments, but the arguments are, as
1308. it were, our servants, and each of them must await our pleasure to be finished; for
1309. we have neither judge, nor, as the poets have, any spectator set over us to censure
1310. and rule us.
1311. SOCRATES: Very well, that is quite appropriate, since it is your wish; and let us
1312. speak of the leaders; for why should anyone talk about the inferior philosophers?
1313. The leaders, in the first place, from their youth up, remain ignorant of the way to
1314. the agora, do not even know where the court-room is, or the senate-house, or any
1315. other public place of assembly; as for laws and decrees, they neither hear the
1316. debates upon them nor see them when they are published; and the strivings of
1317. political clubs after public offices, and meetings, and banquets, and revellings
1318. with chorus girls—it never occurs to them even in their dreams to indulge in such
1319. things. And whether anyone in the city is of high or low birth, or what evil has
1320. been inherited by anyone from his ancestors, male or female, are matters to which
1321. they pay no more attention than to the number of pints in the sea, as the saying is.
1322. And all these things the philosopher does not even know that he does not know; for
1323. he does not keep aloof from them for the sake of gaining reputation, but really it
1324. is only his body that has its place and home in the city; his mind, considering all
1325. these things petty and of no account, disdains them and is borne in all directions,
1326. as Pindar says, “both below the earth,” and measuring the surface of the earth, and
1327. “above the sky,” studying the stars, and investigating the universal nature of every
1328. thing that is, each in its entirety, never lowering itself to anything close at
1329. hand.
1330. THEODORUS: What do you mean by this, Socrates?
1331. SOCRATES: Why, take the case of Thales, Theodorus. While he was studying the stars
1332. and looking upwards, he fell into a pit, and a neat, witty Thracian servant girl
1333. jeered at him, they say, because he was so eager to know the things in the sky that
1334. he could not see what was there before him at his very feet. The same jest applies
1335. to all who pass their lives in philosophy. For really such a man pays no attention
1336. to his next door neighbor; he is not only ignorant of what he is doing, but he
1337. hardly knows whether he is a human being or some other kind of a creature; but what
1338. a human being is and what is proper for such a nature to do or bear different from
1339. any other, this he inquires and exerts himself to find out. Do you understand,
1340. Theodorus, or not?
1341. THEODORUS: Yes, I do; you are right.
1342. SOCRATES: Hence it is, my friend, such a man, both in private, when he meets with
1343. individuals, and in public, as I said in the beginning, when he is obliged to speak
1344. in court or elsewhere about the things at his feet and before his eyes, is a
1345. laughing-stock not only to Thracian girls but to the multitude in general, for he
1346. falls into pits and all sorts of perplexities through inexperience, and his
1347. awkwardness is terrible, making him seem a fool; for when it comes to abusing people
1348. he has no personal abuse to offer against anyone, because he knows no evil of any
1349. man, never having cared for such things; so his perplexity makes him appear
1350. ridiculous; and as to laudatory speeches and the boastings of others, it becomes
1351. manifest that he is laughing at them—not pretending to laugh, but really laughing—
1352. and so he is thought to be a fool. When he hears a panegyric of a despot or a king
1353. he fancies he is listening to the praises of some herdsman—a swineherd, a shepherd,
1354. or a neatherd, for instance—who gets much milk from his beasts; but he thinks that
1355. the ruler tends and milks a more perverse and treacherous creature than the
1356. herdsmen, and that he must grow coarse and uncivilized, no less than they, for he
1357. has no leisure and lives surrounded by a wall, as the herdsmen live in their
1358. mountain pens. And when he hears that someone is amazingly rich, because he owns ten
1359. thousand acres of land or more, to him, accustomed as he is to think of the whole
1360. earth, this seems very little. And when people sing the praises of lineage and say
1361. someone is of noble birth, because he can show seven wealthy ancestors, he thinks
1362. that such praises betray an altogether dull and narrow vision on the part of those
1363. who utter them;. because of lack of education they cannot keep their eyes fixed upon
1364. the whole and are unable to calculate that every man has had countless thousands of
1365. ancestors and progenitors, among whom have been in any instance rich and poor, kings
1366. and slaves, barbarians and Greeks. And when people pride themselves on a list of
1367. twenty-five ancestors and trace their pedigree back to Heracles, the son of
1368. Amphitryon, the pettiness of their ideas seems absurd to him; he laughs at them
1369. because they cannot free their silly minds of vanity by calculating that
1370. Amphitryon's twenty-fifth ancestor was such as fortune happened to make him, and the
1371. fiftieth for that matter. In all these cases the philosopher is derided by the
1372. common herd, partly because he seems to be contemptuous, partly because he is
1373. ignorant of common things and is always in perplexity.
1374. THEODORUS: That all happens just as you say, Socrates.
1375. SOCRATES: But when, my friend, he draws a man upwards and the other is willing to
1376. rise with him above the level of “What wrong have I done you or you me?” to the
1377. investigation of abstract right and wrong, to inquire what each of them is and
1378. wherein they differ from each other and from all other things, or above the level of
1379. “Is a king happy?” or, on the other hand, “Has he great wealth?” to the
1380. investigation of royalty and of human happiness and wretchedness in general, to see
1381. what the nature of each is and in what way man is naturally fitted to gain the one
1382. and escape the other— when that man of small and sharp and pettifogging mind is
1383. compelled in his turn to give an account of all these things, then the tables are
1384. turned; dizzied by the new experience of hanging at such a height, he gazes downward
1385. from the air in dismay and perplexity; he stammers and becomes ridiculous, not in
1386. the eyes of Thracian girls or other uneducated persons, for they have no perception
1387. of it, but in those of all men who have been brought up as free men, not as slaves.
1388. Such is the character of each of the two classes, Theodorus, of the man who has
1389. truly been brought up in freedom and leisure, whom you call a philosopher—who may
1390. without censure appear foolish and good for nothing when he is involved in menial
1391. services, if, for instance, he does not know how to pack up his bedding, much less
1392. to put the proper sweetening into a sauce or a fawning speech—and of the other, who
1393. can perform all such services smartly and quickly, but does not know how to wear his
1394. cloak as a freeman should, properly draped, still less to acquire the true harmony
1395. of speech and hymn aright the praises of the true life of gods and blessed men.
1396. THEODORUS: If, Socrates, you could persuade all men of the truth of what you say as
1397. you do me, there would be more peace and fewer evils among mankind.
1398. SOCRATES: But it is impossible that evils should be done away with, Theodorus, for
1399. there must always be something opposed to the good; and they cannot have their place
1400. among the gods, but must inevitably hover about mortal nature and this earth.
1401. Therefore we ought to try to escape from earth to the dwelling of the gods as
1402. quickly as we can; and to escape is to become like a god, so far as this is possible;
1403. and to become like a god is to become righteous and holy and wise. But, indeed, my
1404. good friend, it is not at all easy to persuade people that the reason generally
1405. advanced for the pursuit of virtue and the avoidance of vice—namely, in order that a
1406. man may not seem bad and may seem good—is not the reason why the one should be
1407. practiced and the other not; that, I think, is merely old wives' chatter, as the
1408. saying is. Let us give the true reason. A god is in no wise and in no manner
1409. unrighteous, but utterly and perfectly righteous, and there is nothing so like him
1410. as that one of us who in turn becomes most nearly perfect in righteousness. It is
1411. herein that the true cleverness of a man is found and also his worthlessness and
1412. cowardice; for the knowledge of this is wisdom or true virtue, and ignorance of it
1413. is folly or manifest wickedness; and all the other kinds of seeming cleverness and
1414. wisdom are paltry when they appear in public affairs and vulgar in the arts.
1415. Therefore by far the best thing for the unrighteous man and the man whose words or
1416. deeds are impious is not to grant that he is clever through knavery; for such men
1417. glory in that reproach, and think it means that they are not triflers, “useless
1418. burdens upon the earth,” but such as men should be who are to live safely in a
1419. state. So we must tell them the truth—that just because they do not think they are
1420. such as they are, they are so all the more truly; for they do not know the penalty
1421. of unrighteousness, which is the thing they most ought to know. For it is not what
1422. they think it is—scourgings and death, which they sometimes escape entirely when
1423. they have done wrong—but a penalty which it is impossible to escape.
1424. THEODORUS: What penalty do you mean?
1425. SOCRATES: Two patterns, my friend, are set up in the world, the divine, which is
1426. most blessed, and the godless, which is most wretched. But these men do not see that
1427. this is the case, and their silliness and extreme foolishness blind them to the fact
1428. that through their unrighteous acts they are made like the one and unlike the other.
1429. They therefore pay the penalty for this by living a life that conforms to the
1430. pattern they resemble; and if we tell them that, unless they depart from their
1431. “cleverness,” the blessed place that is pure of all things evil will not receive
1432. them after death, and here on earth they will always live the life like themselves—
1433. evil men associating with evil—when they hear this, they will be so confident in
1434. their unscrupulous cleverness that they will think our words the talk of fools.
1435. THEODORUS: Very true, Socrates.
1436. SOCRATES: Yes, my friend, I know. However, there is one thing that has happened to
1437. them: whenever they have to carry on a personal argument about the doctrines to
1438. which they object, if they are willing to stand their ground for a while like men
1439. and do not run away like cowards, then, my friend, they at last become strangely
1440. dissatisfied with themselves and their arguments; their brilliant rhetoric withers
1441. away, so that they seem no better than children. But this is a digression. Let us
1442. turn away from these matters—if we do not, they will come on like an ever-rising
1443. flood and bury in silt our original argument—and let us, if you please, proceed.
1444. THEODORUS: To me, Socrates, such digressions are quite as agreeable as the argument;
1445. for they are easier for a man of my age to follow. However, if you prefer, let us
1446. return to our argument.
1447. SOCRATES: Very well. We were at about the point in our argument where we said that
1448. those who declare that only motion is reality, and that whatever seems to each man
1449. really is to him to whom it seems, are willing to maintain their position in regard
1450. to other matters and to maintain especially in regard to justice that whatever laws
1451. a state makes, because they seem to it just, are just to the state that made them,
1452. as long as they remain in force; but as regards the good, that nobody has the
1453. courage to go on and contend that whatever laws a state passes thinking them
1454. advantageous to it are really advantageous as long as they remain in force, unless
1455. what he means is merely the name “advantageous”; and that would be making a joke of
1456. our argument. Am I right?
1457. THEODORUS: Certainly.
1458. SOCRATES: Yes; for he must not mean merely the name, but the thing named must be the
1459. object of his attention.
1460. THEODORUS: True.
1461. SOCRATES: But the state, in making laws, aims, of course, at advantage, whatever the
1462. name it gives it, and makes all its laws as advantageous as possible to itself, to
1463. the extent of its belief and ability; or has it in making laws anything else in
1464. view? The legislator may call his laws advantageous, and that name, if it is given
1465. them when they are enacted, will belong to them, whatever their character may be..
1466. THEODORUS: Certainly not.
1467. SOCRATES: And does it always hit the mark, or does every state often miss it?
1468. THEODORUS: I should say they do often miss it!
1469. SOCRATES: Continuing, then, and proceeding from this point, every one would more
1470. readily agree to this assertion, if the question were asked concerning the whole
1471. class to which the advantageous belongs; and that whole class, it would seem,
1472. pertains to the future. For when we make laws, we make them with the idea that they
1473. will be advantageous in after time; and this is rightly called the future.
1474. THEODORUS: Certainly.
1475. SOCRATES: Come then, on this assumption, let us question Protagoras or someone of
1476. those who agree with him. Man is the measure of all things, as your school says,
1477. Protagoras, of the white, the heavy, the light, everything of that sort without
1478. exception; for he possesses within himself the standard by which to judge them, and
1479. when his thoughts about them coincide with his sensations, he thinks what to him is
1480. true and really is. Is not that what they say?
1481. THEODORUS: Yes.
1482. SOCRATES: Does he, then, also, Protagoras, we shall say, possess within himself the
1483. standard by which to judge of the things which are yet to be, and do those things
1484. which he thinks will be actually come to pass for him who thought them? Take, for
1485. instance, heat; if some ordinary man thinks he is going to take a fever, that is to
1486. say, that this particular heat will be, and some other man, who is a physician,
1487. thinks the contrary, whose opinion shall we expect the future to prove right? Or
1488. perhaps the opinion of both, and the man will become, not hot or feverish to the
1489. physician, but to himself both?
1490. THEODORUS: No, that would be ridiculous.
1491. SOCRATES: But, I imagine, in regard to the sweetness or dryness which will be in a
1492. wine, the opinion of the husbandman, not that of the lyre-player, will be valid.
1493. THEODORUS: Of course.
1494. SOCRATES: And again, in a matter of discord or tunefulness in music that has never
1495. been played, a gymnastic teacher could not judge better than a musician what will,
1496. when performed, seem tuneful even to a gymnastic teacher himself.
1497. THEODORUS: Certainly not.
1498. SOCRATES: Then, too, when a banquet is in preparation the opinion of him who is to
1499. be a guest, unless he has training in cookery, is of less value concerning the
1500. pleasure that will be derived from the viands than that of the cook. For we need not
1501. yet argue about that which already is or has been pleasant to each one but
1502. concerning that which will in the future seem and be pleasant to each one, is he
1503. himself the best judge for himself, or would you, Protagoras—at least as regards the
1504. arguments which will be persuasive in court to each of us—be able to give an opinion
1505. beforehand better than anyone whatsoever who has no especial training?
1506. THEODORUS: Certainly, Socrates, in this, at any rate, he used to declare
1507. emphatically that he himself excelled everyone.
1508. SOCRATES: Yes, my friend, he certainly did; otherwise nobody would have paid him a
1509. high fee. for his conversations, if he had not made his pupils believe that neither
1510. a prophet nor anyone else could judge better than himself what was in the future to
1511. be and seem.
1512. THEODORUS: Very true.
1513. SOCRATES: Both lawmaking, then, and the advantageous are concerned with the future,
1514. and everyone would agree that a state in making laws must often fail to attain the
1515. greatest advantage?
1516. THEODORUS: Assuredly.
1517. SOCRATES: Then it will be a fair answer if we say to your master that he is obliged
1518. to agree that one man is wiser than another, and that such a wise man is a measure,
1519. but that I, who am without knowledge, am not in the least obliged to become a
1520. measure, as the argument in his behalf just now tried to oblige me to be, whether I
1521. would or no.
1522. THEODORUS: In that respect, Socrates, I think that the argument is most clearly
1523. proved to be wrong, and it is proved wrong in this also, in that it declares the
1524. opinions of others to be valid, whereas it was shown that they do not consider his
1525. arguments true at all.
1526. SOCRATES: In many other respects, Theodorus, it could be proved that not every
1527. opinion of every person is true, at any rate in matters of that kind; but it is more
1528. difficult to prove that opinions are not true in regard to the momentary states of
1529. feeling of each person, from which our perceptions and the opinions concerning them
1530. arise. But perhaps I am quite wrong; for it may be impossible to prove that they are
1531. not true, and those who say that they are manifest and are forms of knowledge may
1532. perhaps be right, and Theaetetus here was not far from the mark in saying that
1533. perception and knowledge are identical. o we must, as the argument in behalf of
1534. Protagoras enjoined upon us, come up closer and examine this doctrine of motion as
1535. the fundamental essence, rapping on it to see whether it rings sound or unsound. As
1536. you know, a strife has arisen about it, no mean one, either, and waged by not a few
1537. combatants.
1538. THEODORUS: Yes, far from mean, and it is spreading far and wide all over Ionia; for
1539. the disciples of Heracleitus are supporting this doctrine very vigorously.
1540. SOCRATES: Therefore, my dear Theodorus, we must all the more examine it from the
1541. beginning as they themselves present it.
1542. THEODORUS: Certainly we must. For it is no more possible, Socrates, to discuss these
1543. doctrines of Heracleitus (or, as you say, of Homer or even earlier sages) with the
1544. Ephesians themselves—those, at least, who profess to be familiar with them—than with
1545. madmen. For they are, quite in accordance with their text-books, in perpetual
1546. motion; but as for keeping to an argument or a question and quietly answering and
1547. asking in turn, their power of doing that is less than nothing; or rather the words
1548. “nothing at all” fail to express the absence from these fellows of even the
1549. slightest particle of rest. But if you ask one of them a question, he pulls out
1550. puzzling little phrases, like arrows from a quiver, and shoots them off; and if you
1551. try to get hold of an explanation of what he has said, you will be struck with
1552. another phrase of novel and distorted wording, and you never make any progress
1553. whatsoever with any of them, nor do they themselves with one another, for that
1554. matter, but they take very good care to allow nothing to be settled either in an
1555. argument or in their own minds, thinking, I suppose, that this is being stationary;
1556. but they wage bitter war against the stationary, and, so far as they can, they
1557. banish it altogether.
1558. SOCRATES: Perhaps, Theodorus, you have seen the men when they are fighting, but have
1559. not been with them when they are at peace; for they are no friends of yours; but I
1560. fancy they utter such peaceful doctrines at leisure to those pupils whom they wish
1561. to make like themselves.
1562. THEODORUS: What pupils, my good man? Such people do not become pupils of one
1563. another, but they grow up of themselves, each one getting his inspiration from any
1564. chance source, and each thinks the other knows nothing. From these people, then, as
1565. I was going to say, you would never get an argument either with their will or
1566. against it; but we must ourselves take over the question and investigate it as if it
1567. were a problem of mathematics.
1568. SOCRATES: Yes, what you say is reasonable. Now as for the problem, have we not heard
1569. from the ancients, who concealed their meaning from the multitude by their poetry,
1570. that the origin of all things is Oceanus and Tethys, flowing streams, and that
1571. nothing is at rest and likewise from the modern, who, since they are wiser, declare
1572. their meaning openly, in order that even cobblers may hear and know their wisdom and
1573. may cease from the silly belief that some things are at rest and others in motion,
1574. and, after learning that everything is in motion, may honor their teachers? But,
1575. Theodorus, I almost forgot that others teach the opposite of this, “So that it is
1576. motionless, the name of which is the All,” and all the other doctrines maintained by
1577. Melissus and Parmenides and the rest, in opposition to all these they maintain that
1578. everything is one and is stationary within itself, having no place in which to move.
1579. What shall we do with all these people, my friend? For, advancing little by little,
1580. we have unwittingly fallen between the two parties, and, unless we protect ourselves
1581. and escape somehow, we shall pay the penalty, like those in the palaestra, who in
1582. playing on the line are caught by both sides and dragged in opposite directions. I
1583. think, then, we had better examine first the one party, those whom we originally set
1584. out to join, the flowing ones, and if we find their arguments sound, we will help
1585. them to pull us over, trying thus to escape the others; but if we find that the
1586. partisans of “the whole” seem to have truer doctrines, we will take refuge with them
1587. from those who would move what is motionless. But if we find that neither party has
1588. anything reasonable to say, we shall be ridiculous if we think that we, who are of
1589. no account, can say anything worth while after having rejected the doctrines of very
1590. ancient and very wise men. Therefore, Theodorus, see whether it is desirable to go
1591. forward into so great a danger.
1592. THEODORUS: Oh, it would be unendurable, Socrates, not to examine thoroughly the
1593. doctrines of both parties.
1594. SOCRATES: Then they must be examined, since you are so urgent. Now I think the
1595. starting-point of our examination of the doctrine of motion is this: Exactly what do
1596. they mean, after all, when they say that all things are in motion? What I wish to
1597. ask is this: Do they mean to say that there is only one kind of motion or, as I
1598. believe, two? But it must not be my belief alone; you must share it also, that if
1599. anything happens to us we may suffer it in common. Tell me, do you call it motion
1600. when a thing changes its place or turns round in the same place?
1601. THEODORUS: Yes.
1602. SOCRATES: Let this, then, be one kind of motion. Now when a thing remains in the
1603. same place, but grows old, or becomes black instead of white, or hard instead of
1604. soft, or undergoes any other kind of alteration, is it not proper to say that this
1605. is another kind of motion?
1606. THEODORUS: I think so.
1607. SOCRATES: Nay, it must be true. So I say that there are these two kinds of motion:
1608. “alteration,” and “motion in space.”
1609. THEODORUS: And you are right.
1610. SOCRATES: Now that we have made this distinction, let us at once converse with those
1611. who say that all things are in motion, and let us ask them, “Do you mean that
1612. everything moves in both ways, moving in space and undergoing alteration, or one
1613. thing in both ways and another in one of the two ways only?”
1614. THEODORUS: By Zeus, I cannot tell! But I think they would say that everything moves
1615. in both ways.
1616. SOCRATES: Yes; otherwise, my friend, they will find that things in motion are also
1617. things at rest, and it will be no more correct to say that all things are in motion
1618. than that all things are at rest.
1619. THEODORUS: What you say is very true.
1620. SOCRATES: Then since they must be in motion, and since absence of motion must be
1621. impossible for anything, all things are always in all kinds of motion.
1622. THEODORUS: Necessarily.
1623. SOCRATES: Then just examine this point of their doctrine. Did we not find that they
1624. say that heat or whiteness or anything you please arises in some such way as this,
1625. namely that each of these moves simultaneously with perception between the active
1626. and the passive element, and the passive becomes percipient, but not perception, and
1627. the active becomes, not a quality, but endowed with a quality? Now perhaps quality
1628. seems an extraordinary word, and you do not understand it when used with general
1629. application, so let me give particular examples. For the active element becomes
1630. neither heat nor whiteness, but hot or white, and other things in the same way; you
1631. probably remember that this was what we said earlier in our discourse, that nothing
1632. is in itself unvaryingly one, neither the active nor the passive, but from the union
1633. of the two with one another the perceptions and the perceived give birth and the
1634. latter become things endowed with some quality while the former become percipient.
1635. THEODORUS: I remember, of course.
1636. SOCRATES: Let us then pay no attention to other matters, whether they teach one
1637. thing or another; but let us attend strictly to this only, which is the object of
1638. our discussion. Let us ask them, “Are all things, according to your doctrine, in
1639. motion and flux?” Is that so?
1640. THEODORUS: Yes.
1641. SOCRATES: Have they then both kinds of motion which we distinguished? Are they
1642. moving in space and also undergoing alteration?
1643. THEODORUS: Of course; that is, if they are to be in perfect motion.
1644. SOCRATES: Then if they moved only in space, but did not undergo alteration, we could
1645. perhaps say what qualities belong to those moving things which are in flux, could we
1646. not?
1647. THEODORUS: That is right.
1648. SOCRATES: But since not even this remains fixed—that the thing in flux flows white,
1649. but changes, so that there is a flux of the very whiteness, and a change of color,
1650. that it may not in that way be convicted of remaining fixed, is it possible to give
1651. any name to a color, and yet to speak accurately?
1652. THEODORUS: How can it be possible, Socrates, or to give a name to anything else of
1653. this sort, if while we are speaking it always evades us, being, as it is, in flux?
1654. SOCRATES: But what shall we say of any of the perceptions, such as seeing or
1655. hearing? Does it perhaps remain fixed in the condition of eeing or hearing?
1656. THEODORUS: It must be impossible, if all things are in motion.
1657. SOCRATES: Then we must not speak of seeing more than not seeing, or of any other
1658. perception more than of non-perception, if all things are in all kinds of motion.
1659. THEODORUS: No, we must not.
1660. SOCRATES: And yet perception is knowledge, as Theaetetus and I said.
1661. THEODORUS: Yes, you did say that.
1662. SOCRATES: Then when we were asked “what is knowledge?” we answered no more what
1663. knowledge is than what not-knowledge is..
1664. THEODORUS: So it seems.
1665. SOCRATES: This would be a fine result of the correction of our answer, when we were
1666. so eager to show that all things are in motion, just for the purpose of making that
1667. answer prove to be correct. But this, I think, did prove to be true, that if all
1668. things are in motion, every answer to any question whatsoever is equally correct,
1669. and we may say it is thus or not thus—or, if you prefer, “becomes thus,” to avoid
1670. giving them fixity by using the word “is.”
1671. THEODORUS: You are right.
1672. SOCRATES: Except, Theodorus, that I said “thus,” and “not thus”; but we ought not
1673. even to say “thus”; for “thus” would no longer be in motion; nor, again, “not thus.”
1674. For there is no motion in “this” either; but some other expression must be supplied
1675. for those who maintain this doctrine, since now they have, according to their own
1676. hypothesis, no words, unless it be perhaps the word “nohow.” That might be most
1677. fitting for them, since it is indefinite.
1678. THEODORUS: At any rate that is the most appropriate form of speech for them.
1679. SOCRATES: So, Theodorus, we have got rid of your friend, and we do not yet concede
1680. to him that every man is a measure of all things, unless he be a sensible man; and
1681. we are not going to concede that knowledge is perception, at least not by the theory
1682. of universal motion, unless Theaetetus here has something different to say.
1683. THEODORUS: An excellent idea, Socrates; for now that this matter is settled, I too
1684. should be rid of the duty of answering your questions according to our agreement,
1685. since the argument about Protagoras is ended.
1686. THEAETETUS: No, Theodorus, not until you and Socrates have discussed those who say
1687. all things are at rest, as you proposed just now.
1688. THEODORUS: A young man like you, Theaetetus, teaching your elders to do wrong by
1689. breaking their agreements! No; prepare to answer Socrates yourself for the rest of
1690. the argument.
1691. THEAETETUS: I will if he wishes it. But I should have liked best to hear about the
1692. doctrine I mentioned.
1693. THEODORUS: Calling Socrates to an argument is calling cavalry into an open plain.
1694. Just ask him a question and you shall hear.
1695. SOCRATES: Still I think, Theodorus, I shall not comply with the request of
1696. Theaetetus.
1697. THEODORUS: Why will you not comply with it?
1698. SOCRATES: Because I have a reverential fear of examining in a flippant manner
1699. Melissus and the others who teach that the universe is one and motionless, and
1700. because I reverence still more one man, Parmenides. Parmenides seems to me to be, in
1701. Homer's words, “one to be venerated” and also “awful.” For I met him when I was very
1702. young and he was very old, and he appeared to me to possess an absolutely noble
1703. depth of mind. So I am afraid we may not understand his words and may be still
1704. farther from understanding what he meant by them; but my chief fear is that the
1705. question with which we started, about the nature of knowledge, may fail to be
1706. investigated, because of the disorderly crowd of arguments which will burst in upon
1707. us if we let them in; especially as the argument we are now proposing is of vast
1708. extent, and would not receive its deserts if we treated it as a side issue, and if
1709. we treat it as it deserves, it will take so long as to do away with the discussion
1710. about knowledge. Neither of these things ought to happen, but we ought to try by the
1711. science of midwifery to deliver Theaetetus of the thoughts about knowledge with
1712. which he is pregnant.
1713. THEODORUS: Yes, if that is your opinion, we ought to do so.
1714. SOCRATES: Consider, then, Theaetetus, this further point about what has been said.
1715. Now you answered that perception is knowledge, did you not?
1716. THEAETETUS: Yes.
1717. SOCRATES: If, then, anyone should ask you, “By what does a man see white and black
1718. colors and by what does he hear high and low tones?” you would, I fancy, say, “By
1719. his eyes and ears.”
1720. THEAETETUS: Yes, I should.
1721. SOCRATES: The easy use of words and phrases and the avoidance of strict precision is
1722. in general a sign of good breeding; indeed, the opposite is hardly worthy of a
1723. gentleman, but sometimes it is necessary, as now it is necessary to object to your
1724. answer, in so far as it is incorrect. Just consider; which answer is more correct,
1725. that our eyes are that by which we see or that through which we see, and our ears
1726. that by which or that through which we hear?
1727. THEAETETUS: I think, Socrates, we perceive through, rather than by them, in each
1728. case.
1729. SOCRATES: Yes, for it would be strange indeed, my boy, if there are many senses
1730. ensconced within us, as if we were so many wooden horses of Troy, and they do not
1731. all unite in one power, whether we should call it soul or something else, by which
1732. we perceive through these as instruments the objects of perception.
1733. THEAETETUS: I think what you suggest is more likely than the other way.
1734. SOCRATES: Now the reason why I am so precise about the matter is this: I want to
1735. know whether there is some one and the same power within ourselves by which we
1736. perceive black and white through the eyes, and again other qualities through the
1737. other organs, and whether you will be able, if asked, to refer all such activities
1738. to the body. But perhaps it is better that you make the statement in answer to a
1739. question than that I should take all the trouble for you. So tell me: do you not
1740. think that all the organs through which you perceive hot and hard and light and
1741. sweet are parts of the body? Or are they parts of something else?
1742. THEAETETUS: Of nothing else.
1743. SOCRATES: And will you also be ready to agree that it is impossible to perceive
1744. through one sense. what you perceive through another; for instance, to perceive
1745. through sight what you perceive through hearing, or through hearing what you
1746. perceive through sight?
1747. THEAETETUS: Of course I shall.
1748. SOCRATES: Then if you have any thought about both of these together, you would not
1749. have perception about both together either through one organ or through the other.
1750. THEAETETUS: No.
1751. SOCRATES: Now in regard to sound and color, you have, in the first place, this
1752. thought about both of them, that they both exist?
1753. THEAETETUS: Certainly.
1754. SOCRATES: And that each is different from the other and the same as itself?
1755. THEAETETUS: Of course.
1756. SOCRATES: And that both together are two and each separately is one?
1757. THEAETETUS: Yes, that also.
1758. SOCRATES: And are you able also to observe whether they are like or unlike each
1759. other?
1760. THEAETETUS: May be.
1761. SOCRATES: Now through what organ do you think all this about them? For it is
1762. impossible to grasp that which is common to them both either through hearing or
1763. through sight. Here is further evidence for the point I am trying to make: if it
1764. were possible to investigate the question whether the two, sound and color, are
1765. bitter or not, you know that you will be able to tell by what faculty you will
1766. investigate it, and that is clearly neither hearing nor sight, but something else.
1767. THEAETETUS: Of course it is,—the faculty exerted through the tongue.
1768. SOCRATES: Very good. But through what organ is the faculty exerted which makes known
1769. to you that which is common to all things, as well as to these of which we are
1770. speaking—that which you call being and not-being, and the other attributes of
1771. things, about which we were asking just now? What organs will you assign for all
1772. these, through which that part of us which perceives gains perception of each and
1773. all of them?
1774. THEAETETUS: You mean being and not-being, and likeness and unlikeness, and identity
1775. and difference, and also unity and plurality as applied to them. And you are
1776. evidently asking also through what bodily organs we perceive by our soul the odd and
1777. the even and everything else that is in the same category.
1778. SOCRATES: Bravo, Theaetetus! you follow me exactly; that is just what I mean by my
1779. question.
1780. THEAETETUS: By Zeus, Socrates, I cannot answer, except that I think there is no
1781. special organ at all for these notions, as there are for those others; but it
1782. appears to me that the soul views by itself directly what all things have in common.
1783. SOCRATES: Why, you are beautiful, Theaetetus, and not, as Theodorus said, ugly; for
1784. he who speaks beautifully is beautiful and good. But besides being beautiful, you
1785. have done me a favor by relieving me from a long discussion, if you think that the
1786. soul views some things by itself directly and others through the bodily faculties;
1787. for that was my own opinion, and I wanted you to agree..
1788. THEAETETUS: Well, I do think so.
1789. SOCRATES: To which class, then, do you assign being; for this, more than anything
1790. else, belongs to all things?
1791. THEAETETUS: I assign them to the class of notions which the soul grasps by itself
1792. directly.
1793. SOCRATES: And also likeness and unlikeness and identity and difference?
1794. THEAETETUS: Yes.
1795. SOCRATES: And how about beautiful and ugly, and good and bad?
1796. THEAETETUS: I think that these also are among the things the essence of which the
1797. soul most certainly views in their relations to one another, reflecting within
1798. itself upon the past and present in relation to the future.
1799. SOCRATES: Stop there. Does it not perceive the hardness of the hard through touch,
1800. and likewise the softness of the soft?
1801. THEAETETUS: Yes.
1802. SOCRATES: But their essential nature and the fact that they exist, and their
1803. opposition to one another, and, in turn, the essential nature of this opposition,
1804. the soul itself tries to determine for us by reverting to them and comparing them
1805. with one another.
1806. THEAETETUS: Certainly.
1807. SOCRATES: Is it not true, then, that all sensations which reach the soul through the
1808. body, can be perceived by human beings, and also by animals, from the moment of
1809. birth; whereas reflections about these, with reference to their being and
1810. usefulness, are acquired, if at all, with difficulty and slowly, through many
1811. troubles, in other words, through education?
1812. THEAETETUS: Assuredly.
1813. SOCRATES: Is it, then, possible for one to attain “truth” who cannot even get as far
1814. as “being”?
1815. THEAETETUS: No.
1816. SOCRATES: And will a man ever have knowledge of anything the truth of which he fails
1817. to attain?
1818. THEAETETUS: How can he, Socrates?
1819. SOCRATES: Then knowledge is not in the sensations, but in the process of reasoning
1820. about them; for it is possible, apparently, to apprehend being and truth by
1821. reasoning, but not by sensation.
1822. THEAETETUS: So it seems.
1823. SOCRATES: Then will you call the two by the same name, when there are so great
1824. differences between them?
1825. THEAETETUS: No, that would certainly not be right.
1826. SOCRATES: What name will you give, then, to the one which includes seeing, hearing,
1827. smelling, being cold, and being hot?
1828. THEAETETUS: Perceiving. What other name can I give it?
1829. SOCRATES: Collectively you call it, then, perception?
1830. THEAETETUS: Of course.
1831. SOCRATES: By which, we say, we are quite unable to apprehend truth, since we cannot
1832. apprehend being, either.
1833. THEAETETUS: No; certainly not.
1834. SOCRATES: Nor knowledge either, then.
1835. THEAETETUS: No.
1836. SOCRATES: Then, Theaetetus, perception and knowledge could never be the same.
1837. THEAETETUS: Evidently not, Socrates; and indeed now at last it has been made
1838. perfectly clear that knowledge is something different from perception..
1839. SOCRATES: But surely we did not begin our conversation in order to find out what
1840. knowledge is not, but what it is. However, we have progressed so far, at least, as
1841. not to seek for knowledge in perception at all, but in some function of the soul,
1842. whatever name is given to it when it alone and by itself is engaged directly with
1843. realities.
1844. THEAETETUS: That, Socrates, is, I suppose, called having opinion.
1845. SOCRATES: You suppose rightly, my friend. Now begin again at the beginning. Wipe out
1846. all we said before, and see if you have any clearer vision, now that you have
1847. advanced to this point. Say once more what knowledge is.
1848. THEAETETUS: To say that all opinion is knowledge is impossible, Socrates, for there
1849. is also false opinion; but true opinion probably is knowledge. Let that be my
1850. answer. For if it is proved to be wrong as we proceed, I will try to give another,
1851. just as I have given this.
1852. SOCRATES: That is the right way, Theaetetus. It is better to speak up boldly than to
1853. hesitate about answering, as you did at first. For if we act in this way, one of two
1854. things will happen: either we shall find what we are after, or we shall be less
1855. inclined to think we know what we do not know at all; and surely even that would be
1856. a recompense not to be despised. Well, then, what do you say now? Assuming that
1857. there are two kinds of opinion, one true and the other false, do you define
1858. knowledge as the true opinion?
1859. THEAETETUS: Yes. That now seems to me to be correct.
1860. SOCRATES: Is it, then, still worth while, in regard to opinion, to take up again—?
1861. THEAETETUS: What point do you refer to?
1862. SOCRATES: Somehow I am troubled now and have often been troubled before, o that I
1863. have been much perplexed in my own reflections and in talking with others, because I
1864. cannot tell what this experience is which we human beings have, and how it comes
1865. about.
1866. THEAETETUS: What experience?
1867. SOCRATES: That anyone has false opinions. And so I am considering and am still in
1868. doubt whether we had better let it go or examine it by another method than the one
1869. we followed a while ago.
1870. THEAETETUS: Why not, Socrates, if there seems to be the least need of it? For just
1871. now, in talking about leisure, you and Theodorus said very truly that there is no
1872. hurry in discussions of this sort.
1873. SOCRATES: You are right in reminding me. For perhaps this is a good time to retrace
1874. our steps. For it is better to finish a little task well than a great deal
1875. imperfectly.
1876. THEAETETUS: Of course.
1877. SOCRATES: How, then, shall we set about it? What is it that we do say? Do we say
1878. that in every case of opinion there is a false opinion, and one of us has a false,
1879. and another a true opinion, because, as we believe, it is in the nature of things
1880. that this should be so?
1881. THEAETETUS: Yes, we do..
1882. SOCRATES: Then this, at any rate, is possible for us, is it not, regarding all
1883. things collectively and each thing separately, either to know or not to know them?
1884. For learning and forgetting, as intermediate stages, I leave out of account for the
1885. present, for just now they have no bearing upon our argument.
1886. THEAETETUS: Certainly, Socrates, nothing is left in any particular case except
1887. knowing or not knowing it.
1888. SOCRATES: Then he who forms opinion must form opinion either about what he knows or
1889. about what he does not know?
1890. THEAETETUS: Necessarily.
1891. SOCRATES: And it is surely impossible that one who knows a thing does not know it,
1892. or that one who does not know it knows it.
1893. THEAETETUS: Certainly.
1894. SOCRATES: Then does he who forms false opinions think that the things which he knows
1895. are not these things, but some others of the things he knows, and so, knowing both,
1896. is he ignorant of both?
1897. THEAETETUS: That is impossible, Socrates.
1898. SOCRATES: Well then, does he think that the things he does not know are other things
1899. which he does not know—which is as if a man who knows neither Theaetetus nor
1900. Socrates should conceive the idea that Socrates is Theaetetus or Theaetetus
1901. Socrates?
1902. THEAETETUS: That is impossible.
1903. SOCRATES: But surely a man does not think that the things he knows are the things he
1904. does not know, or again that the things he does not know are the things he knows.
1905. THEAETETUS: That would be a monstrous absurdity.
1906. SOCRATES: Then how could he still form false opinions? For inasmuch as all things
1907. are either known or unknown to us, it is impossible, I imagine, to form opinions
1908. outside of these alternatives, and within them it is clear that there is no place
1909. for fake opinion.
1910. THEAETETUS: Very true.
1911. SOCRATES: Had we, then, better look for what we are seeking, not by this method of
1912. knowing and not knowing, but by that of being and not being?
1913. THEAETETUS: What do you mean?
1914. SOCRATES: We may simply assert that he who on any subject holds opinions which are
1915. not, will certainly think falsely, no matter what the condition of his mind may be
1916. in other respects.
1917. THEAETETUS: That, again, is likely, Socrates.
1918. SOCRATES: Well then, what shall we say, Theaetetus, if anyone asks us, “Is that
1919. which is assumed in common speech possible at all, and can any human being hold an
1920. opinion which is not, whether it be concerned with any of the things which are, or
1921. be entirely independent of them?” We, I fancy, hall reply, “Yes, when, in thinking,
1922. he thinks what is not true,” shall we not?
1923. THEAETETUS: Yes.
1924. SOCRATES: And is the same sort of thing possible in any other field?
1925. THEAETETUS: What sort of thing?
1926. SOCRATES: For instance, that a man sees something, but sees nothing.
1927. THEAETETUS: How can he?
1928. SOCRATES: Yet surely if a man sees any one thing, he sees something that is. Or do
1929. you, perhaps, think “one” is among the things that are not?
1930. THEAETETUS: No, I do not.
1931. SOCRATES: Then he who sees any one thing, sees something that is.
1932. THEAETETUS: That is clear..
1933. SOCRATES: And therefore he who hears anything, hears some one thing and therefore
1934. hears what is.
1935. THEAETETUS: Yes.
1936. SOCRATES: And he who touches anything, touches some one thing, which is, since it is
1937. one?
1938. THEAETETUS: That also is true.
1939. SOCRATES: So, then, does not he who holds an opinion hold an opinion of some one
1940. thing?
1941. THEAETETUS: He must do so.
1942. SOCRATES: And does not he who holds an opinion of some one thing hold an opinion of
1943. something that is?
1944. THEAETETUS: I agree.
1945. SOCRATES: Then he who holds an opinion of what is not holds an opinion of nothing.
1946. THEAETETUS: Evidently.
1947. SOCRATES: Well then, he who holds an opinion of nothing, holds no opinion at all.
1948. THEAETETUS: That is plain, apparently.
1949. SOCRATES: Then it is impossible to hold an opinion of that which is not, either in
1950. relation to things that are, or independently of them.
1951. THEAETETUS: Evidently.
1952. SOCRATES: Then holding false opinion is something different from holding an opinion
1953. of that which is not?
1954. THEAETETUS: So it seems.
1955. SOCRATES: Then false opinion is not found to exist in us either by this method or by
1956. that which we followed a little while ago.
1957. THEAETETUS: No, it certainly is not.
1958. SOCRATES: But does not that which we call by that name arise after the following
1959. manner?
1960. THEAETETUS: After what manner?
1961. SOCRATES: We say that false opinion is a kind of interchanged opinion, when a person
1962. makes an exchange in his mind and says that one thing which exists is another thing
1963. which exists. For in this way he always holds an opinion of what exists, but of one
1964. thing instead of another; so he misses the object he was aiming at in his thought
1965. and might fairly be said to hold a false opinion.
1966. THEAETETUS: Now you seem to me to have said what is perfectly right. For when a man,
1967. in forming an opinion, puts ugly instead of beautiful, or beautiful instead of ugly,
1968. he does truly hold a false opinion.
1969. SOCRATES: Evidently, Theaetetus, you feel contempt of me, and not fear.
1970. THEAETETUS: Why in the world do you say that?
1971. SOCRATES: You think, I fancy, that I would not attack your “truly false” by asking
1972. whether it is possible for a thing to become slowly quick or heavily light, or any
1973. other opposite, by a process opposite to itself, in accordance, not with its own
1974. nature, but with that of its opposite. But I let this pass, that your courage may
1975. not fail. You are satisfied, you say, that false opinion is interchanged opinion?
1976. THEAETETUS: I am.
1977. SOCRATES: It is, then, in your opinion, possible for the mind to regard one thing as
1978. another and not as what it is.
1979. THEAETETUS: Yes, it is.
1980. SOCRATES: Now when one's mind does this, does it not necessarily have a thought
1981. either of both things together or of one or the other of them?
1982. THEAETETUS: Yes, it must; either of both at the same time or in succession.
1983. SOCRATES: Excellent. And do you define thought as I do?
1984. THEAETETUS: How do you define it?
1985. SOCRATES: As the talk which the soul has with itself about any subjects which it
1986. considers. You must not suppose that I know this that I am declaring to you. But the
1987. soul, as the image presents itself to me, when it thinks, is merely conversing with
1988. itself, asking itself questions and answering, affirming and denying. When it has
1989. arrived at a decision, whether slowly or with a sudden bound, and is at last agreed,
1990. and is not in doubt, we call that its opinion; and so I define forming opinion as
1991. talking and opinion as talk which has been held, not with someone else, nor yet
1992. aloud, but in silence with oneself. How do you define it?
1993. THEAETETUS: In the same way.
1994. SOCRATES: Then whenever a man has an opinion that one thing is another, he says to
1995. himself, we believe, that the one thing is the other.
1996. THEAETETUS: Certainly.
1997. SOCRATES: Now call to mind whether you have ever said to yourself that the beautiful
1998. is most assuredly ugly, or the wrong right, or—and this is the sum of the whole
1999. matter—consider whether you have ever tried to persuade yourself that one thing is
2000. most assuredly another, or whether quite the contrary is the case, and you have
2001. never ventured, even in sleep, to say to yourself that the odd is, after all,
2002. certainly even, or anything of that sort.
2003. THEAETETUS: You are right.
2004. SOCRATES: Do you imagine that anyone else, sane or insane, ever ventured to say to
2005. himself seriously and try to persuade himself that the ox must necessarily be a
2006. horse, or two one?
2007. THEAETETUS: No, by Zeus, I do not.
2008. SOCRATES: Then if forming opinion is talking to oneself, no one who talks and forms
2009. opinion of two objects and apprehends them both with his soul, could say and have
2010. the opinion that one is the other. But you will also have to give up the expression
2011. “one and other.” This is what I mean, that nobody holds the opinion that the ugly is
2012. beautiful, or anything of that sort.
2013. THEAETETUS: Well, Socrates, I do give it up; and I agree with you in what you say.
2014. SOCRATES: You agree, therefore, that he who holds an opinion of both things cannot
2015. hold the opinion that one is the other.
2016. THEAETETUS: So it seems.
2017. SOCRATES: But surely he who holds an opinion of one only, and not of the other at
2018. all, will never hold the opinion that one is the other.
2019. THEAETETUS: You are right; for he would be forced to apprehend also that of which he
2020. holds no opinion.
2021. SOCRATES: Then neither he who holds opinion of both nor he who holds it of one can
2022. hold the opinion that a thing is something else. And so anyone who sets out to
2023. define false opinion as interchanged opinion would be talking nonsense. Then neither
2024. by this method nor by our previous methods is false opinion found to exist in us.
2025. THEAETETUS: Apparently not.
2026. SOCRATES: But yet, Theaetetus, if this is found not to exist, we shall be forced to
2027. admit many absurdities.
2028. THEAETETUS: What absurdities?
2029. SOCRATES: I will not tell you until I have tried to consider the matter in every
2030. way. For I should be ashamed of us, if, in our perplexity, we were forced to make
2031. such admissions as those to which I refer. But if we find the object of our quest,
2032. and are set free from perplexity, then, and not before, we will speak of others as
2033. involved in those absurdities, and we ourselves shall stand free from ridicule. But
2034. if we find no escape from our perplexity, we shall, I fancy, become low-spirited,
2035. like seasick people, and shall allow the argument to trample on us and do to us
2036. anything it pleases. Hear, then, by what means I still see a prospect of success for
2037. our quest.
2038. THEAETETUS: Do speak.
2039. SOCRATES: I shall deny that we were right when we agreed that it is impossible for a
2040. man to have opinion that the things he does not know are the things which he knows,
2041. and thus to be deceived. But there is a way in which it is possible.
2042. THEAETETUS: Do you mean what I myself suspected when we made the statement to which
2043. you refer, that sometimes I, though I know Socrates, saw at a distance someone whom
2044. I did not know, and thought it was Socrates whom I do know? In such a case false
2045. opinion does arise.
2046. SOCRATES: But did not we reject that, because it resulted in our knowing and not
2047. knowing the things which we know?
2048. THEAETETUS: Certainly we did.
2049. SOCRATES: Let us, then, not make that assumption, but another; perhaps it will turn
2050. out well for us, perhaps the opposite. But we are in such straits that we must turn
2051. every argument round and test it from all sides. Now see if this is sensible: Can a
2052. man who did not know a thing at one time learn it later?
2053. THEAETETUS: To be sure he can.
2054. SOCRATES: Again, then, can he learn one thing after another?
2055. THEAETETUS: Why not?
2056. SOCRATES: Please assume, then, for the sake of argument, that there is in our souls
2057. a block of wax, in one case larger, in another smaller, in one case the wax is
2058. purer, in another more impure and harder, in some cases softer, and in some of
2059. proper quality.
2060. THEAETETUS: I assume all that.
2061. SOCRATES: Let us, then, say that this is the gift of Memory, the mother of the
2062. Muses, and that whenever we wish to remember anything we see or hear or think of in
2063. our own minds, we hold this wax under the perceptions and thoughts and imprint them
2064. upon it, just as we make impressions from seal rings; and whatever is imprinted we
2065. remember and know as long as its image lasts, but whatever is rubbed out or cannot
2066. be imprinted we forget and do not know.
2067. THEAETETUS: Let us assume that.
2068. SOCRATES: Now take a man who knows the things which he sees and hears, and is
2069. considering some one of them; observe whether he may not gain a false opinion in the
2070. following manner.
2071. THEAETETUS: In what manner?
2072. SOCRATES: By thinking that the things which he knows are sometimes things which he
2073. knows and sometimes things which he does not know. For we were wrong before in
2074. agreeing that this is impossible.
2075. THEAETETUS: What do you say about it now?.
2076. SOCRATES: We must begin our discussion of the matter by making the following
2077. distinctions: It is impossible for anyone to think that one thing which he knows and
2078. of which he has received a memorial imprint in his soul, but which he does not
2079. perceive, is another thing which he knows and of which also he has an imprint, and
2080. which he does not perceive. And, again, he cannot think that what he knows is that
2081. which he does not know and of which he has no seal; nor that what he does not know
2082. is another thing which he does not know; nor that what he does not know is what he
2083. knows; nor can he think that what he perceives is something else which he perceives;
2084. nor that what he perceives is something which he does not perceive; nor that what he
2085. does not perceive is something else which he does not perceive; nor that what he
2086. does not perceive is something which he perceives. And, again, it is still more
2087. impossible, if that can be, to think that a thing which he knows and perceives and
2088. of which he has an imprint which accords with the perception is another thing which
2089. he knows and perceives and of which he has an imprint which accords with the
2090. perception. And he cannot think that what he knows and perceives and of which he has
2091. a correct memorial imprint is another thing which he knows; nor that a thing which
2092. he knows and perceives and of which he has such an imprint is another thing which he
2093. perceives; nor again that a thing which he neither knows nor perceives is another
2094. thing which he neither knows nor perceives; nor that a thing which he neither knows
2095. nor perceives is another thing which he does not know; nor that a thing which he
2096. neither knows nor perceives is another thing which he does not perceive. In all
2097. these cases it is impossible beyond everything for false opinion to arise in the
2098. mind of anyone. The possibility that it may arise remains, if anywhere, in the
2099. following cases.
2100. THEAETETUS: What cases are they? I hope they may help me to understand better; for
2101. now I cannot follow you.
2102. SOCRATES: The cases in which he may think that things which he knows are some other
2103. things which he knows and perceives; or which he does not know, but perceives; or
2104. that things which he knows and perceives are other things which he knows and
2105. perceives.
2106. THEAETETUS: Now I am even more out of the running than before.
2107. SOCRATES: Then let me repeat it in a different way. I know Theodorus and remember
2108. within myself what sort of a person he is, and just so I know Theaetetus, but
2109. sometimes I see them, and sometimes I do not, sometimes I touch them, sometimes not,
2110. sometimes I hear them or perceive them through some other sense, and sometimes I
2111. have no perception of you at all, but I remember you none the less and know you in
2112. my own mind. Is it not so?
2113. THEAETETUS: Certainly.
2114. SOCRATES: This, then, is the first of the points which I wish to make clear. Note
2115. that one may perceive or not perceive that which one knows.
2116. THEAETETUS: That is true.
2117. SOCRATES: So, too, with that which he does not know—he may often not even perceive
2118. it, and often he may merely perceive it?
2119. THEAETETUS: That too is possible.
2120. SOCRATES: See if you follow me better now. If Socrates. knows Theodorus and
2121. Theaetetus, but sees neither of them and has no other perception of them, he never
2122. could have the opinion within himself that Theaetetus is Theodorus. Am I right or
2123. wrong?
2124. THEAETETUS: You are right.
2125. SOCRATES: Now that was the first of the cases of which I spoke.
2126. THEAETETUS: Yes, it was.
2127. SOCRATES: The second is this: knowing one of you and not knowing the other, and not
2128. perceiving either of you, I never could think that the one whom I know is the one
2129. whom I do not know.
2130. THEAETETUS: Right.
2131. SOCRATES: And this is the third case: not knowing and not perceiving either of you,
2132. I could not think that he whom I do not know is someone else whom I do not know. And
2133. imagine that you have heard all the other cases again in succession, in which I
2134. could never form false opinions about you and Theodorus, either when I know or do
2135. not know both of you, or when I know one and not the other; and the same is true if
2136. we say “perceive” instead of “know.” Do you follow me?
2137. THEAETETUS: I follow you.
2138. SOCRATES: Then the possibility of forming false opinion remains in the following
2139. case: when, for example, knowing you and Theodorus, and having on that block of wax
2140. the imprint of both of you, as if you were signet-rings, but seeing you both at a
2141. distance and indistinctly, I hasten to assign the proper imprint of each of you to
2142. the proper vision, and to make it fit, as it were, its own footprint, with the
2143. purpose of causing recognition; but I may fail in this by interchanging them, and
2144. put the vision of one upon the imprint of the other, as people put a shoe on the
2145. wrong foot; or, again, I may be affected as the sight is affected when we use a
2146. mirror and the sight as it flows makes a change from right to left, and thus make a
2147. mistake; it is in such cases, then, that interchanged opinion occurs and the forming
2148. of false opinion arises.
2149. THEAETETUS: I think it does, Socrates. You describe what happens to opinion
2150. marvelously well.
2151. SOCRATES: There is still the further case, when, knowing both of you, I perceive one
2152. in addition to knowing him, but do not perceive the other, and the knowledge which I
2153. have of that other is not in accord with my perception. This is the case I described
2154. in this way before, and at that time you did not understand me.
2155. THEAETETUS: No, I did not.
2156. SOCRATES: This is what I meant, that if anyone knows and perceives one of you, and
2157. has knowledge of him which accords with the perception, he will never think that he
2158. is someone else whom he knows and perceives and his knowledge of whom accords with
2159. the perception. That was the case, was it not?
2160. THEAETETUS: Yes.
2161. SOCRATES: But we omitted, I believe, the case of which I am speaking now—the case in
2162. which we say the false opinion arises: when a man knows both and sees both (or has
2163. some other perception of them), but fails to hold the two imprints each under its
2164. proper perception; like a bad archer he shoots beside the mark and misses it; and it
2165. is just this which is called error or deception.
2166. THEAETETUS: And properly so.
2167. SOCRATES: Now when perception is present to one of the imprints but not to the
2168. other, and the mind applies the imprint of the absent perception to the perception
2169. which is present, the mind is deceived in every such instance. In a word, if our
2170. present view is sound, false opinion or deception seems to be impossible in relation
2171. to things which one does not know and has never perceived; but it is precisely in
2172. relation to things which we know and perceive that opinion turns and twists,
2173. becoming false and true—true when it puts the proper imprints and seals fairly and
2174. squarely upon one another, and false when it applies them sideways and aslant.
2175. THEAETETUS: Well, then, Socrates, is that view not a good one?
2176. SOCRATES: After you have heard the rest, you will be still more inclined to say so.
2177. For to hold a true opinion is a good thing, but to be deceived is a disgrace.
2178. THEAETETUS: Certainly.
2179. SOCRATES: They say the cause of these variations is as follows: When the wax in the
2180. soul of a man is deep and abundant and smooth and properly kneaded, the images that
2181. come through the perceptions are imprinted upon this heart of the soul—as Homer
2182. calls it in allusion to its similarity to wax—; when this is the case, and in such
2183. men, the imprints, being clear and of sufficient depth, are also lasting. And men of
2184. this kind are in the first place quick to learn, and secondly they have retentive
2185. memories, and moreover they do not interchange the imprints of their perceptions,
2186. but they have true opinions. For the imprints are clear and have plenty of room, so
2187. that such men quickly assign them to their several moulds, which are called
2188. realities; and these men, then, are called wise. Or do you not agree?
2189. THEAETETUS: Most emphatically.
2190. SOCRATES: Now when the heart of anyone is shaggy (a condition which the all-wise
2191. poet commends), or when it is unclean or of impure wax, or very soft or hard, those
2192. whose wax is soft are quick to learn, but forgetful, and those in whom it is hard
2193. are the reverse. But those in whom it is shaggy and rough and stony, infected with
2194. earth or dung which is mixed in it, receive indistinct imprints from the moulds. So
2195. also do those whose wax is hard; for the imprints lack depth. And imprints in soft
2196. wax are also indistinct, because they melt together and quickly become blurred; but
2197. if besides all this they are crowded upon one another through lack of room, in some
2198. mean little soul, they are still more indistinct. So all these men are likely to
2199. have false opinions. For when they see or hear or think of anything, they cannot
2200. quickly assign things to the right imprints, but are slow about it, and because they
2201. assign them wrongly they usually see and hear and think amiss. These men, in turn,
2202. are accordingly said to be deceived about realities and ignorant.
2203. THEAETETUS: You are right as right could be, Socrates.
2204. SOCRATES: Shall we, then, say that false opinions exist in us?
2205. THEAETETUS: Assuredly.
2206. SOCRATES: And true opinions, no doubt?
2207. THEAETETUS: And true ones also.
2208. SOCRATES: Then now at last we think we have reached a valid agreement, that these
2209. two kinds of opinion incontestably exist?
2210. THEAETETUS: Most emphatically.
2211. SOCRATES: Truly, Theaetetus, a garrulous man is a strange and unpleasant creature!
2212. THEAETETUS: Eh? What makes you say that?
2213. SOCRATES: Vexation at my own stupidity and genuine garrulity. For what else could
2214. you call it when a man drags his arguments up and down because he is so stupid that
2215. he cannot be convinced, and is hardly to be induced to give up any one of them?
2216. THEAETETUS: But you, why are you vexed?
2217. SOCRATES: I am not merely vexed, I am actually afraid; for I do not know what answer
2218. to make if anyone asks me: “Socrates, have you found out, I wonder, that false
2219. opinion exists neither in the relations of the perceptions to one another nor in the
2220. thoughts, but in the combination of perception with thought?” I shall say “yes,” I
2221. suppose, and put on airs, as if we had made a fine discovery.
2222. THEAETETUS: It seems to me, Socrates, that the result we have now brought out is not
2223. half bad.
2224. SOCRATES: “Do you go on and assert, then,” he will say, “that we never could imagine
2225. that the man whom we merely think of, but do not see, is a horse which also we do
2226. not see or touch or perceive by any other sense, but merely think of?” I suppose I
2227. shall say that I do make that assertion.
2228. THEAETETUS: Yes, and you will be right.
2229. SOCRATES: “Then,” he will say, “according to that, could we ever imagine that the
2230. number eleven which is merely thought of, is the number twelve which also is merely
2231. thought of?” Come now, it is for you to answer.
2232. THEAETETUS: Well, my answer will be that a man might imagine the eleven that he sees
2233. or touches to be twelve, but that he could never have that opinion concerning the
2234. eleven that he has in his mind.
2235. SOCRATES: Well, then, do you think that anyone ever considered in his own mind five
2236. and seven,—. I do not mean by setting before his eyes seven men and five men and
2237. considering them, or anything of that sort, but seven and five in the abstract,
2238. which we say are imprints in the block of wax, and in regard to which we deny the
2239. possibility of forming false opinions—taking these by themselves, do you imagine
2240. that anybody in the world has ever considered them, talking to himself and asking
2241. himself what their sum is, and that one person has said and thought eleven, and
2242. another twelve, or do all say and think that it is twelve?
2243. THEAETETUS: No, by Zeus; many say eleven, and if you take a larger number for
2244. consideration, there is greater likelihood of error. For I suppose you are speaking
2245. of any number rather than of these only.
2246. SOCRATES: You are right in supposing so; and consider whether in that instance the
2247. abstract twelve in the block of wax is not itself imagined to be eleven.
2248. THEAETETUS: It seems so.
2249. SOCRATES: Have we not, then, come back again to the beginning of our talk? For the
2250. man who is affected in this way imagines that one thing which he knows is another
2251. thing which be knows. This we said was impossible, and by this very argument we were
2252. forcing false opinion out of existence, that the same man might not be forced to
2253. know and not know the same things at the same time.
2254. THEAETETUS: Very true.
2255. SOCRATES: Then we must show that forming false opinion is something or other
2256. different from the interchange of thought and perception. For if it were that, we
2257. should never be deceived in abstract thoughts. But as the case now stands, either
2258. there is no false opinion or it is possible for a man not to know that which he
2259. knows. Which alternative will you choose?
2260. THEAETETUS: There is no possible choice, Socrates.
2261. SOCRATES: And yet the argument is not likely to admit both. But still, since we must
2262. not shrink from any risk, what if we should try to do a shameless deed?
2263. THEAETETUS: What is it?
2264. SOCRATES: To undertake to tell what it really is to know.
2265. THEAETETUS: And why is that shameless?
2266. SOCRATES: You seem not to remember that our whole talk from the beginning has been a
2267. search for knowledge, because we did not know what it is.
2268. THEAETETUS: Oh yes, I remember.
2269. SOCRATES: Then is it not shameless to proclaim what it is to know, when we are
2270. ignorant of knowledge? But really, Theaetetus, our talk has been badly tainted with
2271. unclearness all along; for we have said over and over again “we know” and “we do not
2272. know” and “we have knowledge” and “we have no knowledge,” as if we could understand
2273. each other, while we were still ignorant of knowledge; and at this very moment, if
2274. you please, we have again used the terms “be ignorant” and “understand,” as though
2275. we had any right to use them if we are deprived of knowledge.
2276. THEAETETUS: But how will you converse, Socrates, if you refrain from these words?.
2277. SOCRATES: Not at all, being the man I am; but I might if I were a real reasoner; if
2278. such a man were present at this moment he would tell us to refrain from these terms,
2279. and would criticize my talk scathingly. But since we are poor creatures, shall I
2280. venture to say what the nature of knowing is? For it seems to me that would be of
2281. some advantage.
2282. THEAETETUS: Venture it then, by Zeus. You shall have full pardon for not refraining
2283. from those terms.
2284. SOCRATES: Have you heard what they say nowadays that knowing is?
2285. THEAETETUS: Perhaps; however, I don't remember just at this moment.
2286. SOCRATES: They say it is having knowledge.
2287. THEAETETUS: True.
2288. SOCRATES: Let us make a slight change and say possessing knowledge.
2289. THEAETETUS: Why, how will you claim that the one differs from the other?
2290. SOCRATES: Perhaps it doesn't; but first hear how it seems to me to differ, and then
2291. help me to test my view.
2292. THEAETETUS: I will if I can.
2293. SOCRATES: Well, then, having does not seem to me the same as possessing. For
2294. instance, if a man bought a cloak and had it under his control, but did not wear it,
2295. we should certainly say, not that he had it, but that he possessed it.
2296. THEAETETUS: And rightly.
2297. SOCRATES: Now see whether it is possible in the same way for one who possesses
2298. knowledge not to have it, as, for instance, if a man should catch wild birds—pigeons
2299. or the like—and should arrange an aviary at home and keep them in it, we might in a
2300. way assert that he always has them because he possesses them, might we not?
2301. THEAETETUS: Yes.
2302. SOCRATES: And yet in another way that he has none of them, but that he has acquired
2303. power over them, since he has brought them under his control in his own enclosure,
2304. to take them and hold them whenever he likes, by catching whichever bird he pleases,
2305. and to let them go again; and he can do this as often as be sees fit.
2306. THEAETETUS: That is true.
2307. SOCRATES: Once more, then, just as a while ago we contrived some sort of a waxen
2308. figment in the soul, so now let us make in each soul an aviary stocked with all
2309. sorts of birds, some in flocks apart from the rest, others in small groups, and some
2310. solitary, flying hither and thither among them all.
2311. THEAETETUS: Consider it done. What next?
2312. SOCRATES: We must assume that while we are children this receptacle is empty, and we
2313. must understand that the birds represent the varieties of knowledge. And whatsoever
2314. kind of knowledge a person acquires and shuts up in the enclosure, we must say that
2315. he has learned or discovered the thing of which this is the knowledge, and that just
2316. this is knowing.
2317. THEAETETUS: So be it..
2318. SOCRATES: Consider then what expressions are needed for the process of recapturing
2319. and taking and holding and letting go again whichever he please of the kinds of
2320. knowledge, whether they are the same expressions as those needed for the original
2321. acquisition, or others. But you will understand better by an illustration. You admit
2322. that there is an art of arithmetic?
2323. THEAETETUS: Yes.
2324. SOCRATES: Now suppose this to be a hunt after the kinds of knowledge, or sciences,
2325. of all odd and even numbers.
2326. THEAETETUS: I do so.
2327. SOCRATES: Now it is by this art, I imagine, that a man has the sciences of numbers
2328. under his own control and also that any man who transmits them to another does this.
2329. THEAETETUS: Yes.
2330. SOCRATES: And we say that when anyone transmits them he teaches, and when anyone
2331. receives them he learns, and when anyone, by having acquired them, has them in that
2332. aviary of ours, he knows them.
2333. THEAETETUS: Certainly.
2334. SOCRATES: Now pay attention to what follows from this. Does not the perfect
2335. arithmetician understand all numbers; for he has the sciences of all numbers in his
2336. mind?
2337. THEAETETUS: To be sure.
2338. SOCRATES: Then would such a man ever count anything—either any abstract numbers in
2339. his head, or any such external objects as possess number?
2340. THEAETETUS: Of course,
2341. SOCRATES: But we shall affirm that counting is the same thing as considering how
2342. great any number in question is.
2343. THEAETETUS: We shall.
2344. SOCRATES: Then he who by our previous admission knows all number is found to be
2345. considering that which he knows as if he did not know it. You have doubtless heard
2346. of such ambiguities.
2347. THEAETETUS: Yes, I have.
2348. SOCRATES: Continuing, then, our comparison with the acquisition and hunting of the
2349. pigeons, we shall say that the hunting is of two kinds, one before the acquisition
2350. for the sake of possessing, the other carried on by the possessor for the sake of
2351. taking and holding in his hands what he had acquired long before. And just so when a
2352. man long since by learning came to possess knowledge of certain things, and knew
2353. them, he may have these very things afresh by taking up again the knowledge of each
2354. of them separately and holding it—the knowledge which he had acquired long before,
2355. but had not at hand in his mind?
2356. THEAETETUS: That is true.
2357. SOCRATES: This, then, was my question just now: How should we express ourselves in
2358. speaking about them when an arithmetician undertakes to count or a man of letters to
2359. read something? In such a case shall we say that although he knows he sets himself
2360. to learn again from himself that which he knows?
2361. THEAETETUS: But that is extraordinary, Socrates.
2362. SOCRATES: But shall we say that he is going to read or count that which he does not
2363. know, when we have granted that he knows all letters and all numbers?.
2364. THEAETETUS: But that too is absurd.
2365. SOCRATES: Shall we then say that words are nothing to us, if it amuses anyone to
2366. drag the expressions “know” and “learn” one way and another, but since we set up the
2367. distinction that it is one thing to possess knowledge and another thing to have it,
2368. we affirm that it is impossible not to possess what one possesses, so that it never
2369. happens that a man does not know that which he knows, but that it is possible to
2370. conceive a false opinion about it? For it is possible to have not the knowledge of
2371. this thing, but some other knowledge instead, when in hunting for some one kind of
2372. knowledge, as the various kinds fly about, he makes a mistake and catches one
2373. instead of another; so in one example he thought eleven was twelve, because he
2374. caught the knowledge of twelve, which was within him, instead of that of eleven,
2375. caught a ringdove, as it were, instead of a pigeon.
2376. THEAETETUS: Yes, that is reasonable.
2377. SOCRATES: But when he catches the knowledge he intends to catch, he is not deceived
2378. and has true opinion, and so true and false opinion exist and none of the things
2379. which formerly annoyed us interferes? Perhaps you will agree to this; or what will
2380. you do?
2381. THEAETETUS: I will agree.
2382. SOCRATES: Yes, for we have got rid of our difficulty about men not knowing that
2383. which they know; for we no longer find ourselves not possessing that which we
2384. possess, whether we are deceived about anything or not. However, another more
2385. dreadful disaster seems to be coming in sight.
2386. THEAETETUS: What disaster?
2387. SOCRATES: If the interchange of kinds of knowledge should ever turn out to be false
2388. opinion.
2389. THEAETETUS: How so?
2390. SOCRATES: Is it not the height of absurdity, in the first place for one who has
2391. knowledge of something to be ignorant of this very thing, not through ignorance but
2392. through his knowledge; secondly, for him to be of opinion that this thing is
2393. something else and something else is this thing—for the soul, when knowledge has
2394. come to it, to know nothing and be ignorant of all things? For by this argument
2395. there is nothing to prevent ignorance from coming to us and making us know something
2396. and blindness from making us see, if knowledge is ever to make us ignorant.
2397. THEAETETUS: Perhaps, Socrates, we were not right in making the birds
2398. represent kinds of knowledge only, but we ought to have imagined kinds of
2399. ignorance also flying about in the soul with the others; then the hunter would
2400. catch sometimes knowledge and sometimes ignorance of the same thing,
2401. and through the ignorance he would have false, but through the knowledge true
2402. opinion.
2403. SOCRATES: It is not easy, Theaetetus, to refrain from praising you. However, examine
2404. your suggestion once more. Let it be as you say: the man who catches the ignorance
2405. will, you say, have false opinion. Is that it?
2406. THEAETETUS: Yes.
2407. SOCRATES: But surely he will not also think that he has false opinion.
2408. THEAETETUS: Certainly not.
2409. SOCRATES: No, but true opinion, and will have the attitude of knowing that about
2410. which he is deceived.
2411. THEAETETUS: Of course.
2412. SOCRATES: Hence he will fancy that he has caught, and has, knowledge, not ignorance.
2413. THEAETETUS: Evidently.
2414. SOCRATES: Then, after our long wanderings, we have come round again to our first
2415. difficulty. For the real reasoner will laugh and say, “Most excellent Sirs, does a
2416. man who knows both knowledge and ignorance think that one of them, which he knows,
2417. is another thing which he knows; or, knowing neither of them, is he of opinion that
2418. one, which he does not know, is another thing which he does not know; or, knowing
2419. one and not the other, does he think that the one he does not know is the one he
2420. knows; or that the one he knows is the one he does not know? Or will you go on and
2421. tell me that there are kinds of knowledge of the kinds of knowledge and of
2422. ignorance, and that he who possesses these kinds of knowledge and has enclosed them
2423. in some sort of other ridiculous aviaries or waxen figments, knows them, so long as
2424. he possesses them, even if he has them not at hand in his soul? And in this fashion
2425. are you going to be compelled to trot about endlessly in the same circle without
2426. making any progress?” What shall we reply to this, Theaetetus?
2427. THEAETETUS: By Zeus, Socrates, I don't know what to say.
2428. SOCRATES: Then, my boy, is the argument right in rebuking us and in pointing out
2429. that we were wrong to abandon knowledge and seek first for false opinion? It is
2430. impossible to know the latter until we have adequately comprehended the nature of
2431. knowledge.
2432. THEAETETUS: As the case now stands, Socrates, we cannot help thinking as you say.
2433. SOCRATES: To begin, then, at the beginning once more, what shall we say knowledge
2434. is? For surely we are not going to give it up yet, are we?
2435. THEAETETUS: Not by any means, unless, that is, you give it up.
2436. SOCRATES: Tell us, then, what definition will make us contradict ourselves least.
2437. THEAETETUS: The one we tried before, Socrates; at any rate, I have nothing else to
2438. offer.
2439. SOCRATES: What one?
2440. THEAETETUS: That knowledge is true opinion; for true opinion is surely free from
2441. error and all its results are fine and good.
2442. SOCRATES: The man who was leading the way through the river, Theaetetus, said: “The
2443. result itself will show;” and so in this matter, if we go on with our search,
2444. perhaps the thing will turn up in our path and of itself reveal the object of our
2445. search; but if we stay still, we shall discover nothing.
2446. THEAETETUS: You are right; let us go on with our investigation.
2447. SOCRATES: Well, then, this at least calls for slight investigation; for you have a
2448. whole profession which declares that true opinion is not knowledge.
2449. THEAETETUS: How so? What profession is it?
2450. SOCRATES: The profession of those who are greatest in wisdom, who are called orators
2451. and lawyers; for they persuade men by the art which they possess, not teaching them,
2452. but making them have whatever opinion they like. Or do you think there are any
2453. teachers so clever as to be able, in the short time allowed by the water-clock,
2454. atisfactorily to teach the judges the truth about what happened to people who have
2455. been robbed of their money or have suffered other acts of violence, when there were
2456. no eyewitnesses?
2457. THEAETETUS: I certainly do not think so; but I think they can persuade them.
2458. SOCRATES: And persuading them is making them have an opinion, is it not?
2459. THEAETETUS: Of course.
2460. SOCRATES: Then when judges are justly persuaded about matters which one can know
2461. only by having seen them and in no other way, in such a case, judging of them from
2462. hearsay, having acquired a true opinion of them, they have judged without knowledge,
2463. though they are rightly persuaded, if the judgement they have passed is correct,
2464. have they not?
2465. THEAETETUS: Certainly.
2466. SOCRATES: But, my friend, if true opinion and knowledge were the same thing in law
2467. courts, the best of judges could never have true opinion without knowledge; in fact,
2468. however, it appears that the two are different.
2469. THEAETETUS: Oh yes, I remember now, Socrates, having heard someone make the
2470. distinction, but I had forgotten it. He said that knowledge was true opinion
2471. accompanied by reason, but that unreasoning true opinion was outside of the sphere
2472. of knowledge; and matters of which there is not a rational explanation are
2473. unknowable—yes, that is what he called them—and those of which there is are
2474. knowable.
2475. SOCRATES: I am glad you mentioned that. But tell us how he distinguished between the
2476. knowable and the unknowable, that we may see whether the accounts that you and I
2477. have heard agree.
2478. THEAETETUS: But I do not know whether I can think it out; but if someone else were
2479. to make the statement of it, I think I could follow.
2480. SOCRATES: Listen then, while I relate it to you—“a dream for a dream.” I in turn
2481. used to imagine that I heard certain persons say that the primary elements of which
2482. we and all else are composed admit of no rational explanation; for each alone by
2483. itself can only be named, and no qualification can be added, neither that it is nor
2484. that it is not, The length of speeches in the Athenian law courts was limited by a
2485. water-clock.. for that would at once be adding to it existence or non-existence,
2486. whereas we must add nothing to it, if we are to speak of that itself alone. Indeed,
2487. not even “itself” or “that” or “each” or “alone” or “this” or anything else of the
2488. sort, of which there are many, must be added; for these are prevalent terms which
2489. are added to all things indiscriminately and are different from the things to which
2490. they are added; but if it were possible to explain an element, and it admitted of a
2491. rational explanation of its own, it would have to be explained apart from everything
2492. else. But in fact none of the primal elements can be expressed by reason; they can
2493. only be named, for they have only a name; but the things composed of these are
2494. themselves complex, and so their names are complex and form a rational explanation;
2495. for the combination of names is the essence of reasoning. Thus the elements are not
2496. objects of reason or of knowledge, but only of perception, whereas the combinations
2497. of them are objects of knowledge and expression and true opinion. When therefore a
2498. man acquires without reasoning the true opinion about anything, his mind has the
2499. truth about it, but has no knowledge; for he who cannot give and receive a rational
2500. explanation of a thing is without knowledge of it; but when he has acquired also a
2501. rational explanation he may possibly have become all that I have said and may now be
2502. perfect in knowledge. Is that the version of the dream you have heard, or is it
2503. different?
2504. THEAETETUS: That was it exactly.
2505. SOCRATES: Are you satisfied, then, and do you state it in this way, that true
2506. opinion accompanied by reason is knowledge?
2507. THEAETETUS: Precisely.
2508. SOCRATES: Can it be, Theaetetus, that we now, in this casual manner, have found out
2509. on this day what many wise men have long been seeking and have grown grey in the
2510. search?
2511. THEAETETUS: I, at any rate, Socrates, think our present statement is good.
2512. SOCRATES: Probably this particular statement is so; for what knowledge could there
2513. still be apart from reason and right opinion? One point, however, in what has been
2514. said is unsatisfactory to me.
2515. THEAETETUS: What point?
2516. SOCRATES: Just that which seems to be the cleverest; the assertion that the elements
2517. are unknowable and the class of combinations is knowable.
2518. THEAETETUS: Is that not right?
2519. SOCRATES: We are sure to find out, for we have as hostages the examples which he who
2520. said all this used in his argument.
2521. THEAETETUS: What examples?
2522. SOCRATES: The elements in writing, the letters of the alphabet, and their
2523. combinations, the syllables; or do you think the author of the statements we are
2524. discussing had something else in view?
2525. THEAETETUS: No; those are what he had in view. Let us, then, take them up and
2526. examine them, or rather, let us examine ourselves and see whether it was in
2527. accordance with this theory, or not, that we learned letters. First then, the
2528. syllables have a rational explanation, but the letters have not?
2529. THEAETETUS: I suppose so.
2530. SOCRATES: I think so, too, decidedly. Now if anyone should ask about the first
2531. syllable of Socrates; “Theaetetus, tell me, what is SO?” What would you reply?
2532. THEAETETUS: I should say “S and O.”
2533. SOCRATES: This, then, is your explanation of the syllable?
2534. THEAETETUS: Yes.
2535. SOCRATES: Come now, in the same manner give me the explanation of the S.
2536. THEAETETUS: How can one give any elements of an element? For really, Socrates, the S
2537. is a voiceless letter, a mere noise, as of the tongue hissing; B again has neither
2538. voice nor noise, nor have most of the other letters; and so it is quite right to say
2539. that they have no explanation, seeing that the most distinct of them, the seven
2540. vowels, have only voice, but no explanation whatsoever.
2541. SOCRATES: In this point, then, my friend, it would seem that we have reached a right
2542. conclusion about knowledge.
2543. THEAETETUS: I think we have.
2544. SOCRATES: But have we been right in laying down the principle that whereas the
2545. letter is unknowable, yet the syllable is knowable?
2546. THEAETETUS: Probably.
2547. SOCRATES: Well then, shall we say that the syllable is the two letters, or, if there
2548. be more than two, all of them, or is it a single concept that has arisen from their
2549. combination?
2550. THEAETETUS: I think we mean all the letters it contains.
2551. SOCRATES: Now take the case of two, S and O. The two together are the first syllable
2552. of my name. He who knows it knows the two letters, does he not?
2553. THEAETETUS: Of course.
2554. SOCRATES: He knows, that is, the S and the O.
2555. THEAETETUS: Yes.
2556. SOCRATES: How is that? He is ignorant of each, and knowing neither of them he knows
2557. them both?
2558. THEAETETUS: That is monstrous and absurd, Socrates.
2559. SOCRATES: And yet if a knowledge of each letter is necessary before one can know
2560. both, he who is ever to know a syllable must certainly know the letters first, and
2561. so our fine theory will have run away and vanished!
2562. THEAETETUS: And very suddenly, too.
2563. SOCRATES: Yes, for we are not watching it carefully. Perhaps we ought to have said
2564. that the syllable is not the letters, but a single concept that has arisen from
2565. them, having a single form of its own, different from the letters.
2566. THEAETETUS: Certainly; and perhaps that will be better than the other way.
2567. SOCRATES: Let us look into that; we must not give up in such unmanly fashion a great
2568. and impressive theory.
2569. THEAETETUS: No, we must not.
2570. SOCRATES: Let it be, then, as we say now, that the syllable or combination is a
2571. single form arising out of the several conjoined elements, and that it is the same
2572. in words and in all other things.
2573. THEAETETUS: Certainly.
2574. SOCRATES: Therefore there must be no parts of it.
2575. THEAETETUS: How so?
2576. SOCRATES: Because if there are parts of anything, the whole must inevitably be all
2577. the parts; or do you assert also that the whole that has arisen out of the parts is
2578. a single concept different from all the parts?
2579. THEAETETUS: Yes, I do.
2580. SOCRATES: Do you then say that all and the whole are the same, or that each of the
2581. two is different from the other?
2582. THEAETETUS: I am not sure; but you tell me to answer boldly, so I take the risk and
2583. say that they are different.
2584. SOCRATES: Your boldness, Theaetetus, is right; but whether your answer is so remains
2585. to be seen.
2586. THEAETETUS: Yes, certainly, we must see about that.
2587. SOCRATES: The whole, then, according to our present view, would differ from all?
2588. THEAETETUS: Yes.
2589. SOCRATES: How about this? Is there any difference between all in the plural and all
2590. in the singular? For instance, if we say one, two, three, four, five, six, or twice
2591. three, or three times two, or four and two, or three and two and one, are we in all
2592. these forms speaking of the same or of different numbers?
2593. THEAETETUS: Of the same.
2594. SOCRATES: That is, of six?
2595. THEAETETUS: Yes.
2596. SOCRATES: Then in each form of speech we have spoken of all the six?
2597. THEAETETUS: Yes.
2598. SOCRATES: And again do we not speak of one thing when we speak of them all?
2599. THEAETETUS: Assuredly.
2600. SOCRATES: That is, of six?
2601. THEAETETUS: Yes.
2602. SOCRATES: Then in all things that are made up of number, we apply the same term to
2603. all in the plural and all in the singular?
2604. THEAETETUS: Apparently.
2605. SOCRATES: Here is another way of approaching the matter. The number of the fathom
2606. and the fathom are the same, are they not?
2607. THEAETETUS: Yes.
2608. SOCRATES: And of the furlong likewise.
2609. THEAETETUS: Yes.
2610. SOCRATES: And the number of the army is the same as the army, and all such cases are
2611. alike? In each of them all the number is all the thing.
2612. THEAETETUS: Yes.
2613. SOCRATES: And is the number of each anything but the parts of each?
2614. THEAETETUS: No.
2615. SOCRATES: Everything that has parts, accordingly, consists of parts, does it not?
2616. THEAETETUS: Evidently.
2617. SOCRATES: But we are agreed that the all must be all the parts if all the number is
2618. to be the all.
2619. THEAETETUS: Yes.
2620. SOCRATES: Then the whole does not consist of parts, for if it consisted of all the
2621. parts it would be the all.
2622. THEAETETUS: That seems to be true.
2623. SOCRATES: But is a part a part of anything in the world but the whole?
2624. THEAETETUS: Yes, of the all.
2625. SOCRATES: You are putting up a brave fight, Theaetetus. But is not the all precisely
2626. that of which nothing is wanting?
2627. THEAETETUS: Necessarily.
2628. SOCRATES: And is not just this same thing, from which nothing whatsoever is lacking,
2629. a whole? For that from which anything is lacking is neither a whole nor all, which
2630. have become identical simultaneously and for the same reason.
2631. THEAETETUS: I think now that there is no difference between all and whole.
2632. SOCRATES: We were saying, were we not, that if there are parts of anything, the
2633. whole and all of it will be all the parts?
2634. THEAETETUS: Certainly.
2635. SOCRATES: Once more, then, as I was trying to say just now, if the syllable is not
2636. the letters, does it not follow necessarily that it contains the letters, not as
2637. parts of it, or else that being the same as the letters, it is equally knowable with
2638. them?
2639. THEAETETUS: It does.
2640. SOCRATES: And it was in order to avoid this that we assumed that it was different
2641. from them?
2642. THEAETETUS: Yes.
2643. SOCRATES: Well then, if the letters are not parts of the syllable, can you mention
2644. any other things which are parts of it, but are not the letters of it?
2645. THEAETETUS: Certainly not. For if I grant that there are parts of the syllable, it
2646. would be ridiculous to give up the letters and look for other things as parts.
2647. SOCRATES: Without question, then, Theaetetus, the syllable would be, according to
2648. our present view, some indivisible concept.
2649. THEAETETUS: I agree.
2650. SOCRATES: Do you remember, then, my friend, that we admitted a little while ago, on
2651. what we considered good grounds, that there can be no rational explanation of the
2652. primary elements of which other things are composed, because each of them, when
2653. taken by itself, is not composite, and we could not properly apply to such an
2654. element even the expression “be” or “this,” because these terms are different and
2655. alien, and for this reason it is irrational and unknowable?
2656. THEAETETUS: I remember.
2657. SOCRATES: And is not this the sole reason why it is single in form and indivisible?
2658. I can see no other.
2659. THEAETETUS: There is no other to be seen.
2660. SOCRATES: Then the syllable falls into the same class with the letter, if it has no
2661. parts and is a single form?
2662. THEAETETUS: Yes, unquestionably.
2663. SOCRATES: If, then, the syllable is a plurality of letters and is a whole of which
2664. the letters are parts, the syllables and the letters are equally knowable and
2665. expressible, if all the parts were found to be the same as the whole.
2666. THEAETETUS: Certainly.
2667. SOCRATES: But if one and indivisible, then syllable and likewise letter are equally
2668. irrational and unknowable; for the same cause will make them so.
2669. THEAETETUS: I cannot dispute it.
2670. SOCRATES: Then we must not accept the statement of any one who says that the
2671. syllable is knowable and expressible, but the letter is not.
2672. THEAETETUS: No, not if we are convinced by our argument.
2673. SOCRATES: But would you not rather accept the opposite belief, judging by your own
2674. experience when you were learning to read?
2675. THEAETETUS: What experience?
2676. SOCRATES: In learning, you were merely constantly trying to distinguish between the
2677. letters both by sight and by hearing, keeping each of them distinct from the rest,
2678. that you might not be disturbed by their sequence when they were spoken or written.
2679. THEAETETUS: That is very true.
2680. SOCRATES: And in the music school was not perfect attainment the ability to follow
2681. each note and tell which string produced it; and everyone would agree that the notes
2682. are the elements of music?
2683. THEAETETUS: Yes, that is all true.
2684. SOCRATES: Then if we are to argue from the elements and combinations in which we
2685. ourselves have experience to other things in general, we shall say that the elements
2686. as a class admit of a much clearer knowledge than the compounds and of a knowledge
2687. that is much more important for the complete attainment of each branch of learning,
2688. and if anyone says that the compound is by its nature knowable and the element
2689. unknowable, we shall consider that he is, intentionally or unintentionally, joking.
2690. THEAETETUS: Certainly.
2691. SOCRATES: Still other proofs of this might be brought out, I think; but let us not
2692. on that account lose sight of the question before us, which is: What is meant by the
2693. doctrine that the most perfect knowledge arises from the addition of rational
2694. explanation to true opinion?
2695. THEAETETUS: No, we must not.
2696. SOCRATES: Now what are we intended to understand by “rational explanation”? I think
2697. it means one of three things.
2698. THEAETETUS: What are they?
2699. SOCRATES: The first would be making one's own thought clear through speech by means
2700. of verbs and nouns, imaging the opinion in the stream that flows through the lips,
2701. as in a mirror or water. Do you not think the rational explanation is something of
2702. that sort?
2703. THEAETETUS: Yes, I do. At any rate, we say that he who does that speaks or explains.
2704. SOCRATES: Well, that is a thing that anyone can do sooner or later; he can show what
2705. he thinks about anything, unless he is deaf or dumb from the first; and so all who
2706. have any right opinion will be found to have it with the addition of rational
2707. explanation, and there will henceforth be no possibility of right opinion apart from
2708. knowledge.
2709. THEAETETUS: True.
2710. SOCRATES: Let us not, therefore, carelessly accuse him of talking nonsense who gave
2711. the definition of knowledge which we are now considering; for perhaps that is not
2712. what he meant. He may have meant that each person if asked about anything must be
2713. able in reply. to give his questioner an account of it in terms of its elements.
2714. THEAETETUS: As for example, Socrates?
2715. SOCRATES: As, for example, Hesiod, speaking of a wagon, says, “a hundred pieces of
2716. wood in a wagon.” Now I could not name the pieces, nor, I fancy, could you; but if
2717. we were asked what a wagon is, we should be satisfied if we could say “wheels, axle,
2718. body, rims, yoke.”
2719. THEAETETUS: Certainly.
2720. SOCRATES: But he, perhaps, would think we were ridiculous, just as he would if, on
2721. being asked about your name, we should reply by telling the syllables, holding a
2722. right opinion and expressing correctly what we have to say, but should think we were
2723. grammarians and as such both possessed and were expressing as grammarians would the
2724. rational explanation of the name Theaetetus. He would say that it is impossible for
2725. anyone to give a rational explanation of anything with knowledge, until he gives a
2726. complete enumeration of the elements, combined with true opinion. That, I believe,
2727. is what was said before.
2728. THEAETETUS: Yes, it was.
2729. SOCRATES: So, too, he would say that we have right opinion about a wagon, but that
2730. he who can give an account of its essential nature in terms of those one hundred
2731. parts has by this addition added rational explanation to true opinion and has
2732. acquired technical knowledge of the essential nature of a wagon, in place of mere
2733. opinion, by describing the whole in terms of its elements.
2734. THEAETETUS: Do you agree to that, Socrates?
2735. SOCRATES: If you, my friend, agree to it and accept the view that orderly
2736. description in terms of its elements is a rational account of anything, but that
2737. description in terms of syllables or still larger units is irrational, tell me so,
2738. that we may examine the question.
2739. THEAETETUS: Certainly I accept it.
2740. SOCRATES: Do you accept it in the belief that anyone has knowledge of anything when
2741. he thinks that the same element is a part sometimes of one thing and sometimes of
2742. another or when he is of opinion that the same thing has as a part of it sometimes
2743. one thing and sometimes another?
2744. THEAETETUS: Not at all, by Zeus.
2745. SOCRATES: Then do you forget that when you began to learn to read you and the others
2746. did just that?
2747. THEAETETUS: Do you mean when we thought that sometimes one letter and sometimes
2748. another belonged to the same syllable, and when we put the same letter sometimes
2749. into the proper syllable and sometimes into another?
2750. SOCRATES: That is what I mean.
2751. THEAETETUS: By Zeus, I do not forget, nor do I think that those have knowledge who
2752. are in that condition.
2753. SOCRATES: Take an example: When at such a stage in his progress a person in writing
2754. “Theaetetus” thinks he ought to write, and actually does write, TH and E, and again
2755. in trying to write “Theodorus” thinks he ought to write, and does write, TH and E,
2756. shall we say that he knows the first syllable of your names?
2757. THEAETETUS: No, we just now agreed that a person in such a condition has not yet
2758. gained knowledge.
2759. SOCRATES: Then there is nothing to prevent the same person from being in that
2760. condition with respect to the second and third and fourth syllables?
2761. THEAETETUS: No, nothing.
2762. SOCRATES: Then, in that case, he has in mind the orderly description in terms of
2763. letters, and will write “Theaetetus” with right opinion, when he writes the letters
2764. in order?
2765. THEAETETUS: Evidently.
2766. SOCRATES: But he is still, as we say, without knowledge, though he has right
2767. opinion?
2768. THEAETETUS: Yes.
2769. SOCRATES: Yes, but with his opinion he has rational explanation; for he wrote with
2770. the method in terms of letters in his mind, and we agreed that that was rational
2771. explanation.
2772. THEAETETUS: True.
2773. SOCRATES: There is, then, my friend, a combination of right opinion with rational
2774. explanation, which cannot as yet properly be called knowledge?
2775. THEAETETUS: There is not much doubt about it.
2776. SOCRATES: So it seems that the perfectly true definition of knowledge, which we
2777. thought we had, was but a golden dream. Or shall we wait a bit before we condemn it?
2778. Perhaps the definition to be adopted is not this, but the remaining one of the three
2779. possibilities one of which we said must be affirmed by anyone who asserts that
2780. knowledge is right opinion combined with rational explanation.
2781. THEAETETUS: I am glad you called that to mind. For there is still one left. The
2782. first was a kind of vocal image of the thought, the second the orderly approach to
2783. the whole through the elements, which we have just been discussing, and what is the
2784. third?
2785. SOCRATES: It is just the definition which most people would give, that knowledge is
2786. the ability to tell some characteristic by which the object in question differs from
2787. all others.
2788. THEAETETUS: As an example of the method, what explanation can you give me, and of
2789. what thing?
2790. SOCRATES: As an example, if you like, take the sun: I think it is enough for you to
2791. be told that it is the brightest of the heavenly bodies that revolve about the
2792. earth.
2793. THEAETETUS: Certainly.
2794. SOCRATES: Understand why I say this. It is because, as we were just saying, if you
2795. get hold of the distinguishing characteristic by which a given thing differs from
2796. the rest, you will, as some say, get hold of the definition or explanation of it;
2797. but so long as you cling to some common quality, your explanation will pertain to
2798. all those objects to which the common quality belongs.
2799. THEAETETUS: I understand; and it seems to me that it is quite right to call that
2800. kind a rational explanation or definition.
2801. SOCRATES: Then he who possesses right opinion about anything and adds thereto a
2802. comprehension of the difference which distinguishes it from other things will have
2803. acquired knowledge of that thing of which he previously had only opinion.
2804. THEAETETUS: That is what we affirm.
2805. SOCRATES: Theaetetus, now that I have come closer to our statement, I do not
2806. understand it at all. It is like coming close to a scene-painting. While I stood off
2807. at a distance, I thought there was something in it.
2808. THEAETETUS: What do you mean? In which perspective is the main thing.. "
2809. SOCRATES: I will tell you if I can. Assume that I have right opinion about you; if I
2810. add the explanation or definition of you, then I have knowledge of you,
2811. otherwise I have merely opinion.
2812. THEAETETUS: Yes.
2813. SOCRATES: But explanation was, we agreed, the interpretation of your difference.
2814. THEAETETUS: It was.
2815. SOCRATES: Then so long as I had merely opinion, I did not grasp in my thought any of
2816. the points in which you differ from others?
2817. THEAETETUS: Apparently not.
2818. SOCRATES: Therefore I was thinking of some one of the common traits which you
2819. possess no more than other men.
2820. THEAETETUS: You must have been.
2821. SOCRATES: For heaven's sake! How in the world could I in that case have any opinion
2822. about you more than about anyone else? Suppose that I thought “That is Theaetetus
2823. which is a man and has nose and eyes and mouth” and so forth, mentioning all the
2824. parts. Can this thought make me think of Theaetetus any more than of Theodorus or of
2825. the meanest of the Mysians, as the saying is?
2826. THEAETETUS: Of course not.
2827. SOCRATES: But if I think not only of a man with nose and eyes, but of one with snub
2828. nose and protruding eyes, shall I then have an opinion of you any more than of
2829. myself and all others like me?
2830. THEAETETUS: Not at all.
2831. SOCRATES: No; I fancy Theaetetus will not be the object of opinion in me until this
2832. snubnosedness of yours has stamped and deposited in my mind a memorial different
2833. from those of the other examples of snubnosedness that I have seen, and the other
2834. traits that make up your personality have done the like. Then that memorial, if I meet
2835. you again tomorrow, will awaken my memory and make me have right opinion about you.
2836. THEAETETUS: Very true.
2837. SOCRATES: Then right opinion also would have to do with differences in any given instance?
2838. THEAETETUS: At any rate, it seems so.
2839. SOCRATES: Then what becomes of the addition of reason or explanation to right
2840. opinion? For if it is defined as the addition of an opinion of the way in which a
2841. given thing differs from the rest, it is an utterly absurd injunction.
2842. THEAETETUS: How so?
2843. SOCRATES: When we have a right opinion of the way in which certain things differ
2844. from other things, we are told to acquire a right opinion of the way in which those
2845. same things differ from other things! On this plan the twirling of a scytale or a
2846. pestle or anything of the sort would be as nothing compared with this injunction. It
2847. might more justly be called a blind man's giving directions; for to command us to
2848. acquire that which we already have, in order to learn that of which we already have
2849. opinion, is very like a man whose sight is mightily darkened.
2850. THEAETETUS: Tell me now, what did you intend to say when you asked the question a
2851. while ago?
2852. SOCRATES: If, my boy, the command to add reason or explanation means learning to
2853. know and not merely getting an opinion about the difference, our splendid definition of
2854. knowledge would be a fine affair! For learning to know is acquiring knowledge, is it not?
2855. THEAETETUS: Yes.
2856. SOCRATES: Then, it seems, if asked, “What is knowledge?” our leader will reply that
2857. it is right opinion with the addition of a knowledge of difference; for that would,
2858. according to him, be the addition of reason or explanation.
2859. THEAETETUS: So it seems.
2860. SOCRATES: And it is utterly silly, when we are looking for a definition of
2861. knowledge, to say that it is right opinion with knowledge, whether of difference or
2862. of anything else whatsoever. So neither perception, Theaetetus, nor true opinion,
2863. nor reason or explanation combined with true opinion could be knowledge.
2864. THEAETETUS: Apparently not.
2865. SOCRATES: Are we then, my friend, still pregnant and in travail with knowledge, or
2866. have we brought forth everything?
2867. THEAETETUS: Yes, we have, and, by Zeus, Socrates, with your help I have already said
2868. more than there was in me.
2869. SOCRATES: Then does our art of midwifery declare to us that all the offspring that
2870. have been born are mere wind-eggs and not worth rearing?
2871. THEAETETUS: It does, decidedly.
2872. SOCRATES: If after this you ever undertake to conceive other thoughts, Theaetetus,
2873. and do conceive, you will be pregnant with better thoughts than these by reason of
2874. the present search, and if you remain barren, you will be less harsh and gentler to
2875. your associates, for you will have the wisdom not to think you know that which you
2876. do not know. So much and no more my art can accomplish; nor do I know aught of the
2877. things that are known by others, the great and wonderful men who are today and have
2878. been in the past. This art, however, both my mother and I received from the gods, she for
2879. women and I for young and noble men and for all who are fair. And now I must go to
2880. the Porch of the King, to answer to the suit which Meletus has brought against me.
2881. But in the morning, Theodorus, let us meet here again.

 

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